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INTRODUCTION 
The late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were 
periods of great change in both France and Italy. The French 
kingdom emerged from the Hundred Years ' War as a fragmented pol i ty; 
the kings of France were confronted with disloyalty and frequent 
insurrections on the part of the French nobility. The reigns 
of Louis XI (1461-1483) and Charles VIII( 1483-1498), however, saw 
the decline of the great nobles of France and the consolidation 
of France into a unified nation-state under the authority of 
the king. Italy, too, underwent important changes in this period . 
The second half of the fifteenth century was a period of re1a-
tivetranqui11ity in Italy. Though the peninsula was not without 
struggle among the kingdom of Naples, the duchy of Milan, the 
republics of Florence and Venice, and the papal states, its 
five major principalities, these powers were in a rough state 
of balance . Italians of the quattrocento.stressed the differences 
between their own institutions and those of ultramontane Europe . 
Convinced of their cultural and political superiority, they 
operated in a political sphere which they regarded as largely 
independent of the rest of Europe. The French invasion of 
Italy in 1494, made possible in part by the consolidation of 
the French monarchy, was the beginning of a generation of de-
cline for the Italian powers . At this time, a major aspect of 
the struggle between Valois France and the Habsburg Empire 
was fought on Italian soil . The end of this conflict left 
1 
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most of Italy in the hands of foreign rulers by the early 
sixteenth century. 
An investigation of French and Florentine historiography 
reveals their development in light of these political changes. 
The tradition of French vernacular historiography, which began 
around 1200, reflected for almost three centuries the French 
feudal mentality, celebrating chivalry and the knightly heroics 
of noble protagonists. This tradition persisted almost until 
the end of the fourteenth century . The work of Philippe de 
Commynes, an adviser to Louis XI and Charles VIII, breaks 
free from the moribund conceptions of previous French his-
toriography. Commynes was a witness to the decline of the 
French nobility and the rise of the unified state, and his 
account of the reign of Louis XI and of Charles VIII's 
expedition to Italy accurately reflects French politics in his 
day. He discusses the strengths and weaknesses of French 
rulers and seeks to analyze causally the events he records 
in a manner in which his predecessors, constrained by their 
idealistic attachment to the chivalric ideal, could never have 
done . 
Florentine historiography, from the early fourteenth 
century to the end of the foreign invasions of Italy, also 
reflected changes in political affairs. The rise of the 
Florentine polity in the fourteenth century was accompanied by 
a self-conscious local historiography. In the fifteenth 
century, Florentine thought was dominated by humanistic 
classical learning, manifested in Florentine historiography by 
the celebration of Fl orence as the heir of Republican Rome 
3 
and by the imitation of classical historical forms . The 
invasions of Italy sparked an interest in immediate political 
concerns among Florentine thinkers, and in the work of NiccOl~ 
Machiavelli politics and history are almost inseparable. 
Francesco Guicciardini, an active pOlitical figure during this 
period, attempted after Italy's foreign domination was con-
firmed to account for these events. In his History of Italy 
he abandons the political urgency of the work of his prede-
cessors and the humanists ' celebration of their native city 
or a particular polity. -The Italian powers, after all, had 
failed to stem the tide of successive foreign invasions . 
Guicciardini seeks a framework for the analysis of the loss of 
Italian liberty, but can find none . His history is instead 
an investigation of motivations and causes, a work which 
finds no positive explanation for thirty years of war, princely 
foll~ and the sUbjection of Italy to the yoke of foreign rule . 
This paper will assess each author by investigating 
the historiographical tradition out of which he emerged. With 
this in mind, we will then consider Guicciardini and Commyne s 
in the light of their continuities with and departures from 
the Florentine and French traditions . Finally, the two 
historians will be compared in terms of their perceptions 
of causation and their schemes of explanation in their accounts 
of the first French invasion of Italy in 1494 . 
CHAPTER I 
THE CHANGING FACES OF FRANCE AND ITALY 
The Consolidation of the French Monarchy 
And the Origins of the 1494 Invasion 
During the reign of Louis XI(1461-1483)the de.facto 
authority of the king of France was extended to encompass most 
of modern Franceo The reign of his father, Charles VII(1422-1461 ), 
had seen the end of the Hundred Years' War and the beginnings 
of royal consolidation, but it was Louis' reign which saw the 
monarchy's most notable gains. The king was threatened by the 
League of the Public Weal, a group of powerful nobles allied 
against him in defense of the feudal status guo. Their failure 
to defeat him at the Battle of Mont1h~ry, in 1465, was a great 
boost for the king in h is efforts to consolidate control of 
his realm. The death in the 1477 Battle of Nancy of Duke 
Charles the Bold of Burgundy, the king's most powerful and 
vexing vassal, allowed Louis to accomplish the "gathering in"l 
of his kingdom. Charles' daughter and heiress, Mary of Burgundy, 
had neither the men nor the money to oppose the king ' s deter-
mination to annex to the royal domain all 'of the late duke' s 
French possessions. Upon her death in 1482 it was left to 
her husband, Austrian Archduke(and later Holy Roman Emperor ) 
Naximi1an Habsburg, to sign the Peace of Arras with Louis. 
By the terms of this treaty, Louis acquired Burgundy proper , 
4 
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Flemish and Walloon Flanders, Picardy, several Somme towns 
and the Boulonnais region. Portions of the Low Countries, however , 
remained in Habsburg hands . By virtue of the death of Duke 
Rene of Anjou in 1480 and his son, the Count of Maine, in 1481, 
the domains of the crown had been fUrther enriched by the 
duchies of Anjou and Bar and the counties of Maine, Provence , 
Marseilles and Toulon. By the time of his death in 1483, 
Louis was well on his way to absorbing these into the admini-
strative jurisdiction of the French crawn~ The annexation of 
the duchy of Brittany was the one prize which had eluded the 
"spider-king;" it would be accomplished by his son Charles VIII . 
Nonetheless, Louis XI had made unprecedented gains in making 
himself master of all of France. 3 
The death of Louis was expected by many to signal the 
end of the consolidation of the French monarchy and the French 
royal domain . At his accession, Charles VIII was but thirteen 
years of age and was thought by most people, including his 
father, to be unfit to rule. In their perception of the young 
king' s weakness, "the commons dreamed of taxes ' beaten dawn; ' 
the clergy hoped to manage their own affairs as in the palmy 
days of the Gallican church; the nobles , happiest of all, en-
visioned a return to the good old feudal universe.,,4 Foreseeing 
these challenges to his son's authority, Louis had named his 
daughter Anne and her husband, Peter of Beaujeu, as regents 
for Charles VIII. They proved very capable indeed of overcoming 
the threats to the monarchy which arose when in 1484, the 
Estates-General of the realm met and deliberated on nothing 
. d 5 less than " the maklng of a new worl . ff However, their efforts 
6 
to effect change in the administration of the kingdom were 
frustrated by the various members' special interests and when 
the Estates separate~Anne of Beaujeu resumed without difficulty 
the government of France, keeping it until 1491. 6 
/ 
Throughout this period, though, Duke Louis of Orleans was 
a rival to her authority. He undertook a series of ventures 
against the French regents, forming alliances with Henry VII 
of England, King Ferdinand of Aragon, and Emperor Maximi1 iano 
He sought refuge in Brittany, where Duke Francis waS in revolt 
against the French kingdomo In 1488, the armies of Anne of 
'" Beaujeu routed the Breton army and took Louis of Orleans p risoner . 
Anne increased her power and reputation when in the same year 
her brother-in-law, Duke John of Bourbon, died, leaving his 
duchy to Anne's husband and co-regent. Anne steadfastly refused 
to release Louis from his imprisonment 0 In 1491, however, after 
the death of Duke Francis of Brittany had attenuated the threat 
of a Breton invasion, Charles VIII, now in control of the 
. .... 7 
klngdom, released hlS COUSln LOU1S from prlson. Peter of 
Bourbon and Louis of Or1~ans then took joint vows Uto hold one 
another once more in perpetual affection ••• and to loyally 
serve King Charles . u8 
The greatest act that remained to be accomplished in the 
consolidation of the French nation was the union of Brittany 
to France. The young Duchess Anne of Brittany, who had enter-
tained the proposals of French, English and German suitors, 
agreed after extensive negotiations to marry the French king . 
The terms of this "brilliant and difficult" marriage, concluded 
in December of 1491, included a clause which gave Charles ' 
7 
successors her rights to the duchy of Brittany.9 
Charles' next major concern transcended the boundaries of 
the French royal domain. The Italian kingdom of Naples, once 
the possession of the French house of Anjou, had for half a 
century been in the hands of a cadet branch of the royal house 
of Aragon. Charles' thoughts were now directed to the reassertion 
of the French claim to the Neapolitan throneo 
The French claim to the kingdom of Naples dated back to 
1261~ Charles of Anjou was invited in that year by Pope Urban 
IV to occupy the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sici1ies, a 
papal fief, when its last Hohenstaufen occupant died and his 
line was extinguished. The royal house of Aragon also had 
a claim to the throne, established in 1209 when the sister 
of the Aragonese king had married the Hohenstaufen Emperor 
Frederick II. The 1282 War of the Sicilian Vespers, a revolt 
against Angevin rule, resulted in the division of the Kingdom 
of the Two Sici1ies. Peter III of Aragon assumed control of 
Sicily, while Angevin rule over the kingdom of Naples continued. 
Control of the kingdom by the house of Anjou was essentially 
unchallenged until the late fourteenth century, when a rival 
branch of the Angevin line and the royal family of Aragon began 
to assert their claims to the Neapolitan throne. The Angevin 
queen of Naples, Joanna II, appealed to the French for aid in 
1414, but the French, preoccupied with the Hundred Years' War, 
were unable to assist her. In 1442, after a protracted civil 
war Alfonso V, of a cadet line of the Aragonese royal family, 
was invested with the Neapolitan crown by Pope Eugenius IV.10 
King Alfonso of Naples rapidly consolidated his control of 
8 
his new kingdom, and was soon accepted by Italian rulers as 
a part of the Italian political scene. He was a signatory twelve 
years later to the Peace of Lodi, ratified by all five major 
Italian pawers o This treaty ended a period of extended warfare 
in northern Italy, which primarily had ~'Emtailed Venetian and 
Florentine border disputes with the Visconti(and, after 1450, 
Sforza)dukes of Milan, but in which Naples and the papacy had 
beteitl involved as well. While there were disputes among the 
Italian powers in the aftermath of Lodi, the 1454 pact had 
left them in a state of approximate balance which they all took 
great pains to preserve . The Triple Alliance of 1480 among 
Florence, Milan and Naples and the cool diplomacy of Lorenzo 
de' Medici contributed to the preservation of Italian peaceo 
The death of Lorenzo in 1492 and the specter of invasion by 
Charles VIII of France , however, contributed to the breakdown 
of the Italian state-system and the seemingly endless devastating 
. h d 11 wars WhlC ensue 0 
In 1493 a conflict arose between Ludovico Sforza, the 
regent of Milan' s Duke GiangaleazZOand the nephew of Ludovico, 
and King Ferrante of Naples. Giangaleazzo ' s wife, Isabella 
of Aragon, was the daughter of AlfohsO of Calabria, son of the 
Neapolitan king. Isabella complained to her father that 
Ludovico was depriving her husband of his right to govern the 
duchy. Alfonso saw an opportunity to assert the tenuous 
Aragonese claim to the duchy of Milan, obtained in the highly 
disputed testament of the duchy by its last Visconti duke to 
the Aragonese house of Naples. In April of 1493, after attempts 
to reconcile Alfonso and Ludovico failed, Ludovico threatened 
9 
to invite Charles VIII to make good his claim to the throne of 
Nap1es. 12 Ludovico had at one time claimed to be able to move 
the rulers of Europe "like pieces on a chessboard,,,13 and thought 
that Charles would not accept his invitation. 
Ludovico and the rest of Italy's rulers were accustomed 
to the Italians ' traditional conception of their political 
affairs operating independently of the powers beyond the Alps. 
The consolidation of France, the Holy Roman Empire and Spain 
under single rulers, however, made possible the invasions of 
Italy by these powers. Previously, it had been cadet branches 
of Europe's royal houses which had vied for control of parts 
of Italy; the late fifteenth century saw these concerns taken 
up by kings. The AEagonese had long been interested in Italian 
affairs through their involvement in Naples. An Imperial claim 
to the duchy of Milan had been established through a marriage 
between the Habsburg and Sforza families. The marriage of the 
last Visconti heiress to the Milanese duchy to the Duke of 
Or1~ans in the 1440's had given the French a second dynastic 
claim in Italy. This latter claim would be asserted, to no 
aVail, by Louis of Or1~ans during Charles VIII' s Italian 
expedition, but the duke was to make good this claim when 
he was crowned King Louis XII upon the death of Charles in 
1498. Beyond his invitation by Ludovico Sforza to invade Italy, 
Charles VIII himself de sired this expedition. Much of the 
Flemish and Burgundian territory annexed by his father had 
been retaken by the Empire in the 1480's, leading to a feeling 
of encirclement by the growing territories of the Habsburgs . 
Moreover, the duchy of Anjou had become a royal territory during 
10 
the reign of Louis XI . Thus it was no longer a cadet branch 
of the French royal family which held France's claim to the 
Neapolitan throne. The invitation by Ludovico to invade Naples 
was the occasion for the urging of Charles by his "shallow 
favorites" to "assert the glory of his arms.,,14 The king's 
older advisers(including Philippe de Commynes), who had served 
his more prudent f 'ather, argued that this expedition would not 
F h · 1 5 serve renc lnterests . He did not heed their advice, however, 
and decided to accept the invitation extended to him by 
Ludovico Sforza . 
The Subjection of Italy to Foreign Domination 
Charles VIII crossed the Alps in the fall of 1494 . Milan 
had been the power which had invited him to come to Italy; thus 
he encountered no opposition while crossing Milanese territory. 
When he reached Tuscany, however, Florentine fortresses opposed his 
army's progress . Piero de' Medici, who had inherited control 
of Florence upon his father's death in 1492, had initially 
sided with Naples in the ensuing conflict, but was forced to 
reconsider this position when Charles' army threatened Florentine 
dominions . Following the example of his father, who had 
journeyed to Naples to negotiate with King Ferrante when the 
two powers Bad been at war in 1478, Piero left Florence to 
meet the French king. Piero, though, was not blessed with his 
father's diplomatic skill, and surrendered most of Florence's 
North Tuscan possessions to Charles. Piero also enjoyed little 
of the support within Florence that his father had possessed, as 
his failure to support the traditional Florentine alliance wi th France 
11 
had led to the expulsion from France and financial ruin of 
many Florentine merchants. Outraged by P iero's surrender of 
Florentine territory, a large coalition of Florence's citizens 
ousted Piero from power . A new, broadly based republic was 
formed. King Charles entered Florence in November, 1494 as 
the man whom the Dominican friar Girolamo Savonoro1a had p re-
dicted would be sent by God to regenerate Italian politics and 
the Church . Florentine leaders signed a treaty recognizing 
Charles as the protector of Florentine liberties, and Florence 
remained essentially a vassal of the French crown until 1512, 
when the French were driven out of Italy. Charles' formidable 
army passed through the papal states without opposition, and in 
February of 1495 entered the kingdom of Naples. Alfonso, now 
king, resigned the crown hoping that his more popular son 
Ferrantino would be able to rally support. The young king, 
however, was unable to stay the French advance . Charles VIII 
had won the kingdom of Naples without fighting a single battle, 
but it would prove more difficult to hold than to win. 16 
King Ferdinand of Aragon was determined to overthrow 
French rule in Naples and make good on the long-standing 
Aragoneseclaim to the Kingdom of the Two Sici1ies . He was 
instrumental in the organization of the League of Venice in 
March, 1495. The league was joined by the rope Alexander VI, 
Emperor Maximilian, Ludovico Sforza, and the Venetian republic . 
Its purpose was to provide for the mutual defense of their 
states against aggression. Formally, it resembled previous 
treaties among Italian powers, but the inclusion of Spain and 
the Empire pointed to the fact that Italians no longer controlled 
17 the destiny of Italy. 
12 
Charles' rule, which involved the installation of his 
favorites in the Neapolitan bureaucracy, proved extremely un-
popular and difficult to maintain. As he was leaving Italy in 
July of 1495, his armie s met those of the League at the Battle 
of Fornovo, in which both sides suffered heavily . It was not 
so much a French victory as it was a loss for the League, 
which in failing to rout the French army had allowed it to re-
turn safely to France. Meanwhile, the French occupants of 
Naples slowly lost control of the kingdom, and by 1496 Ferrantino 
had regained control of his capital. Charles VIII planned 
another expedition, but his death in 1498 ended his dream of 
18 further conquest. 
Charles' successor to the French throne was Louis of 
Orleans, who became King Louis XII. He, like Charles, coveted 
the Neapolitan crown but, as mentioned earlier, his aspirations 
included the duchy of Milan as well. Thus he assume~ in addition 
to his title of King of France, the titles of King of Naples and 
D . 19. . F . . h h uke of Mllan. Durlng the flrst rench lnvaSlon e ad unsuccess-
fully attempted to make good his Milanese claim by pressing 
King Charles to make war upon Milan while the French army was 
retreat-ing - from Naples, and it continued to be his foremost 
thought. In addition to his own political interest Louis was 
urged to invade Italy by his chief advise~ the Archbishop of 
Rouen George of Amboise, who aspired not only to a cardinalate 
. 20 but to the papacy ltself . 
The reaction of the Italian powers to Louis ' plans set 
the tone Of Italian pol i tics for the duration of the period 
13 
of the ultramontane invasions, and indicates the demoralizing 
effect which Charles' invasion had had upon the Italian powers . 
Their chief thought was not opposition to Louis , but the use 
of his intervention to serve their individual interests. Pope 
Alexander VI hoped that the invasion of Milan would direct the 
attention of that state away from its southern border and would 
allow his son Cesare Borgia to gain control of the Romagna at 
the expense of Milan. Venice, which since Lodi had hoped only 
to keep its western border intact and focus its attention on 
its maritime enterprises, now hoped to expand westward. The 
Venetian government chose to support Louis when he offered 
Venice several Milanese towns in exchange for its support . 
Florence, which in 1495 had refused to join the League of 
Venice and instead aided the French, againi supported the French 
cause , hoping for now for French aid in recovering Pisa, liberated 
from Florentine domination by Charles VIII in 1494. All but 
the recently crowned King Federigo of Naples, whose throne 
Louis XII claime~and some of the petty despots of the Romagna, 
who feared Cesare Borgia, supported the French against Milan . 
Ludovico Sforza's incompetent generals lost garrison after 
garrison, and finally Milan itself. Sforza fled to the Austrian 
Tyrol with his two sons Massimiliano and Francesco, under the 
protection of Emperor Maximilian. A brief attempt by Ludovico 
to regain power failed and the Battle of Novara in 1500 ended 
the independent Sforza dynas~in Milan. Ludovico spent the 
remainder of his life in a French prison. 
Louis XII had already made plans for the kingdom of 
Naples . After prolonged negotiation with Ferdinand of Aragon, 
14 
it was agreed by the two kings in the treaty of Granada of 
November, 1500, that they would partition the Neapolitan kingdom, 
1fith the French controlling the northern half, including Naples 
itself, and Spain controlling the southern half and the island 
of Sicily • . The unfortunate King Federigo of Naples, betrayed 
by his kinsman Ferdinand, agreed to support Louis in his future 
undertakings, and was given the duchy of Anjou in return. 
Disputes among the French and Spanish allies led to the expulsion 
of the French from Naples in 1504. The kingdom had been reunited 
u~der Spanish domination. 
Louis XII ' s Italian expedition had greatly benefited the 
papacy. Cesare Borgia had made himself master of the Romagna. 
His plans for domination of Tuscany were thwarted by the Florentine 
alliance with France, and he considered abandoning his French 
alliance for Spain. His military career ended abruptly, though, 
upon his father's death in 1503. Alexander was succeeded by 
Pope pius III, who reigned briefly and died. His successor, 
Julius II, planned to recover all of the states of the Church 
and then lead an Italian confederation to drive all foreigners 
from Italy and reassert Italian political independence. His 
greatest prize was the city of Bologna, which had eluded 
Cesare Borgia but which was taken by Julius II in 1506 . The 
pattern of alliance on the Italian peninsula, however, was 
drastically altered when the Empire became involved anew in 
Italian affairs. 
Emperor Maximilian Habsburg had been growing increasingly 
anxious about Louis XII's desire to secure the papacy for 
George of Amboise, and wanted to shore up his position in 
15 
Italian affairs . In 1507 he announced his intention to t ravel 
to Rome to receive the imperial investiture from Julius II, 
although his claim to the duchy of Milan could not have been 
absent from his thinking. The Venetian government, seeking 
to limit the role of foreign powers in Italy, had announced i ts 
decision to deny Maximilian passage through Venice's terra 
firma, but he went ahead with his plan to travel to Rome, by 
force of arms if necessary. In 1508 his forces were defeated 
by armies in the employ of Venice, and the Venetian government 
gained control of several hitherto Habsburg cities. Julius II, 
irked by recent Venetian inroads against papal territories, now 
perceived the greatest threat to Italian security to be Venetian 
expansion . In 1508 he organized the League of Cambrai, which 
included himself, Louis XII, the Empire, Mantua and Ferrara . 
That Julius included the French in this league is problematic, 
since his long-term goal was the expulsion of Louis XII from 
Italy. Julius felt, though~ that it was necessary to end Venice ' s 
lust for conquest before such a concerted Italian effort 
could be made. The forces of the League overwhelmed the 
Venetian army, and in 1509, at the Battle of Agnadello, 
Venice lost virtually all of her terra firma possessions . 
Gradually, as Venice's former subject cities realized that 
Venetian overlordship had been preferable to what had followed, 
they returned to the fold . Julius II, having recovered his 
possessions in the Romagna, abandoned the League of Cambrai and 
formed the Holy League against France . The decisive battle 
of this campaign was the battle of Ravenna, fought in 1512 , 
between the forces of the Holy League and the French army . 
16 
It was a victory for the French, for they retained control 
of Milan, but their victory was made very costly by the death 
of their brilliant commander Gaston of Foix. 
With this battle, the Swiss cantons assume an important 
role in Italian affairs. Swiss soldiers had hitherto been em-
ployed by the French as mercenaries, but a series of trade dis-
putes had cooled their friendship with Louis XII, and they 
began to feel that unilateral action would best serve their 
interests. In 1513 the French garrison at Milan was routed by 
the Swiss in the Battle of Novara. The Swiss had brought with them 
Ludovico Sforza's elder son Massimiliano, whom the Holy League 
recognized as Duke of Milan. The Swiss, though', retained real 
control of the duchy. The recent decline of the French in 
Italyz,also meant the end of the francophile Florentine republic 
and the restoration of the Medici to political prominence. Actually, 
the French alliance had been of little benefit to the republic, 
which in 1509 had retaken Pisaexclusively by the force of 
it own arws. In addition, the refusal of Paolo SOderini, the 
leader of the republic, to join the Holy League of Julius II 
against France had incurred the pope's wrath against the city. 
The resulting discontent within Florence played into the hands 
of the Medici party. The election in 1513 of Cardinal Giovanni 
de' Medici to succa9d Julius as Pope Leo~J{ consolidated Medici 
control of Florence. With the M@dici family restored to power 
and the French gone from Italy, the explosiveness of the Italian 
political scene subsided somewhat. Thus, the next French 
invasion found Italy unprepared to deal with the resumption of 
war. 
17 
The third French invasion was undertaken by King Francis I, 
of the house of Valois, who succeeded Louis XII upon his death 
in 1515 . The new king immediately prepared to invade Italy, and 
crossed the Alps in August of that year . The following month, 
the French army routed the Swiss at the battle of Marignano and 
Francis I became Duke of Milan. Pope Leo X renewed the tradition-
al Florentine alliance with France, yielding to the king 
Parma and Piacenza, cities traditionally disputed by Milan 
and the papacy, in exchange for a guarantee by Francis to support 
the Medici in Florence. A.fter Marignano, Spain stood as the 
only effective rival to the power of the French in Italy, and 
all that was left within the power of the Italian political 
leaders during the ensuing Habsburg-Va1ois struggle was to 
attempt "to preserve some measure of freedom by playing off one 
. h 21 agal.nst the ot er." 
Emperor Maximilian died in 1519; the next phase of the 
struggle between these two rival houses was for the imperial 
investiture. Ultimately, it was the superior financial resources 
of Maximilian ' s grandson Charles of Austria that won him the 
election, contested bitterly by King Francis of France. 22 
Pope Leo X had been supporting the French in Italy, but 
desiring cooperation wi.th the German princes in the suppression 
of the Lutheran heresy, he concluded a pact with Char1es·\; V, the 
new Holy Roman Emperor. Later that year their combined forces 
ousted the French from Milan, and restored once again· the 
house of Sforza, in the person of Ludovico ' s younger son 
Francesco, to the duchy. In 1522 the papal-imperial army 
besieged and pillaged Genoa, the last French stronghold in Italy, 
18 
and crippled the French fleet . Leo X had died in 1521, and 
after the brief pontificate of Adrian VI of Utrecht, the 
election in 1523 of Cardinal Giulio de' Medici as Pope Clement 
VII was a great victory for the Emperor, who seemed to have 
the papacy under his control. 
The pattern of shifting alliances continued. Late in 
1524 Clement, Venice and Florence, uneasy with Charles V' s 
successes, concluded a secret alliance with King Francis of 
France. The French army attacked Milan, and the duchy once 
again changed hands. French control was to prove short-lived, 
however, as in February, 1525 the French army, in the Battle of 
Pavia, suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Spanish 
and German armies of the Empire. This battle had immense 
repercussions. France, since Marignano Europe's pre-eminent 
military power,was reduced to second-rate status behind Charles V, 
Europe's new master . Francis I, taken prisoner at Pavia, won 
his release only by renouncing all of his claims to power in 
Italy . 
The continuing concern of Italian leaders with balance of 
power and fluid alliances meant, however, that France's defeat 
attracted allies to her side. In 1526, Clement VII, Francesco 
Sforza(who had been expelled by the Emperor from Milan in favor 
of a Habsburg claimant to the t auchy.), and the governments of 
Florence and Venice formed the Holy League of Cognac to combat 
Charles. The army of the league, with Francesco Guicciardini 
as Commissioner-General, was disorganized and ineffectual. In 
May, 1527 Charles ' armies sacked Rome. The imprisonment of 
Clement VIr meant the end of the current Medici regime in Fl orence 
1 9 
and the restoration of a republic. The French, however, with 
Andrea Doria in command of the Genoese fleet, threatened the 
Habsburgs' control of the kingdom of Naples . When in 1528 Doria , 
sensing imminent French defeat, defected to the Spanish side, 
the French army pressing Naples had no alternative but to retire . 
Thirty-five years of warfare in Italy had come to an end . 
By the terms of the 1529 Treaties of Barcelona and Cambrai, a 
grand settlement was achieved. The Medici were established as 
Grand Dukes of Tuscany, and the duchy of Milan was returned to 
Francesco Sforza. Both principalities remained under the 
domination of the Habsburgs . The two sons of the French King 
Francis, who had four years earlier become Charles V' s pr i soners 
in exchange for their father ' s liberty, were freed . King 
Francis was to marry Eleanor of Austria, the sister of the Emperor, 
, d h' , 'I 23 and once aga1n renounce 1S cla1ms 1n taly. 
Perhaps the most salient observation that can be made 
concerning the affairs of Italy during the period of the invasions 
is that while the narration of the invasions begins with the 
recounting of a conflict between Naples and Milan, it ends 
with a conflict between France and the Holy Roman Empire . 
Italy had indeed lost control of its destiny . 
CHAPTER II 
CELEBRATING THE POLITY : 
Florentine Historiography, 1300-1525 
One of the most important aspects of Italian humanism was 
the attitude toward history characteristic of this movement. 
History emerged in the Renaissance as the record of the actions 
of men, of individuals and groups, acting in a political frame-
work. This had certainly not been the case in much of the his-
torica1 writing of the medieval period . History was divinely 
ordained, the notion that God's judgment was everywhere manifest 
in history was taken for granted by most medieval chronic1er-
. . 1 hlstorlans . 
The roots of Renaissance historiography are to be found in 
the chronicles of fourteenth-century Florence . Medieval Italy 
differed from much of ultramontane Europe in that it was not 
characterized by feudalism, schOlasticism and monarchy. 2 
Medieval Italy was communal, and within the communes factional 
strife and disputes over l ocal political issues were intense. 
These disputes, in which sizeable numbers of lay citizens were 
often inVOlved, evinced among thoughtful citizens an interest 
in the history of their communities, fostering an unprece-
dented, if not uniquely Italian, interest in local historiogra-
phy. In Italy, then, the emergence of the lay historian ' s 
interest in the history of the polity preceded similar 
20 
21 
3 developments in the rest of Europe . 
In fourteenth-century Florence, this historiography can 
be studied most easily in the writings of Giovanni Villani(?-1348) 
and others who followed him. Villani's historical conscious-
ness derived from his status as a member of Florence's merchant 
class and from the recent political experiences of Florence 
in the affairs of Italy. The merchant class in Florence had 
recently wrested political control of the city from the aristo-
cratic noble class, and its commercial progress in the early 
. d" b 4 treeento seeme "lrreslsta le." Florence had also been part of 
the pro-papal Guelph alliance in the thirteenth-century struggle 
between the papacy and the Empire. This association of Florence 
vrith the papacy meant for Villani that Florence merited a 
"centrality within the scheme of the medieval universe it 
could not otherwise have had.,,5 Thus, it was the coincidence 
of the newly-acquired self-confidence of Villani's merchant 
class with an historical background which appeared to justify 
its claim for a place within the medieval world order that 
stimulated Villani's historical consciousness and prompted him 
to write the history of Florence. 6 
While Villani based his discussion of contemporary 
Florentine political affairs on his own independent and astute 
observation, his ideas still reflect the conventions of medieval 
historical thought. He still sets the history of Florence in 
the context of universal history; his Chronicle begins with 
the story of the tower of Babel, and he repeatedly sees the 
hand of divine providence in human events. 7 For Villani, 
the order inherent in history reflects a grand, cosmic design, 
22 
which interweaves natural and supernatural forces into a 
. 8 
harmon1ous whole. 
Villani's cosmic design included fortune as well as God . 
Fortune served an explanatory purpose, as an agent behind those 
historical events that defied explanation. The medieval 
Christian historians viewed fortune as "the undependabi1ity 
and transitoriness of all earthly things;,,9 it was superceded 
by divine providence as the ultimate determinant of human events . 
This was the view adopted by Giovanni Villani. In subsequent 
Renaissance historiography, man was given a more decisive role 
in history. Fortune was to acquire a somewhat different meaning , 
but it retained its basic role as a force to which the inscrutable 
elements of the historical process were ascribed. 
In Villani's scheme, all issues were framed in terms 
10 of a choice between right and wrong, the godly and the ungodly. 
Fortune was seen as operating in a rhythmic fashion, first 
rising, then declining. The operation of fortune in Villani ' s 
Chronicle cannot be separated from the circumstances of the 
papacy, "the identity of whose interests is the kingpin of 
V · l' h h' .. . ,11 11 an1's sc erne of 1stor1ca1 1nterpretat1on.' Villani 
narrates the Guelph struggle against the Hohenstaufen emperors 
in these terms. After it seemed that nothing could avert his 
ultimate triumph, the Emperor Frderick II suffered a series 
of dramatic setbacks. His rise and fall fitted the cyclical 
pattern of fortune described by Villani. Frederick's ultimate 
failure was a function of his "wrong" (i. e . contrary to the interests 
G) . 12 of the papacy and thus of od act1ons. On the death of 
Conradin, the last of the Hohenstaufen lineage, in 1268, Villani 
23 
writes that " it is evident from reason and experience that who-
soever raises himself against the forces of the Church and is 
excommunicated must come to a bad end in soul and body . ,,13 
One recent historian has said of medieval chronicles 
that their organaization "tends to organize facts in a one-thing-
after-another way; and so to exclude explanation, " adding that 
"the favorite connective is not 'because' 'or 'as a result of' 
b h ' 14 ut 'meanw lIe' ." Clearly, however, .Giwanni Villani's 
sense of history transcended such a simple formula . In his 
cyclical pattern of history, success brings pride, pride sin, 
and sl'n leads to decll'ne. 15 I t' 1 F h n excep lIg on y lorence_. and t e 
papacy from the application of this rule, Villani adopts a 
scheme of history that ascribes to his awn age and the circum-
stances of the Florentine republic a central place in the texture 
of time,16 and justifies the parochial focus of his Chronicle 
For most of Villani's lifetime, this scheme was adequate for 
his purposes of historical explanation. It is now assumed 
that he composed his Chronicle beginning in 1322 and continued 
writing until he succumbed to the Plague in 1348 . 17 The last 
decade of Villani ' s life saw events which utterly undermined 
the basis for his reading of history. The Buonacorsi family, 
with which he was commercially affiliated, went bankrupt in 
1338, leading to Villani ' s humiliating imprisonment for debt . 18 
The tyranny of Walter of Brienne, Duke of Athens, an· adventurer 
who came to power in 1340 after a dispute over a war with Lucca 
had internally weakened the Florentine government, was a period 
of political eclipse for the merchant class of which Villani 
was a member . In 1343 , the expulsion from papal service of 
24 
the Bardi and Peruzzi, Florence's two most prominent banking 
families, led to their bankruptcy and the commercial ruin of 
19 Florence. More importantly for Villani, this break with the 
papacy unravelled the Guelph alliance, which had been the thread 
of his view of Florentine history. The final calamitous event 
in Villani'S life was the outbreak of plague in 1347. These di-
sasters led Villani to abandon in the last books of his Chronicle 
the pattern of interpretation used earlier, in which "the course 
of events had easily accomodated itself to an interpretation 
according to which the balance always tipped in favor of the 
f ' h 20 U d ' V' , , orces of rlg teousness." n er1Ylng lllanl's Vlew that all 
things u1timiate1y revert to a moral equilibrium had been the 
original presumption of finite time, bound to culminate in an 
all-encompassing apocalypse. The events of the last decade of 
his life, cUlminating in severe earthquakes in North Italy in 
1348, were interpreted by Villani as the "sign that Jesus Christ, 
preaching to his disciples, predicted should appear at the end of 
the wor1d.,,21 Villani, then, while transcending the medieval 
style of the strict . narration':. of factual information and 
positing an overarching scheme for the arrangement of historical 
evidence, still placed his experience "within the sanctified 
h h d ' , 22 se erne of t e me leva1 unlverse." 
Trecento chroniclers after Giovanni Villani both bor-
rowed from his thought and made sUbstantive changes in his mode 
of historical interpretation. His brother Matteo, who wrote 
from 1348 to 1363, also saw divine retribution as an explanatory 
agent. For Matteo Villani, however, there was no political 
attitude that was always morally " right" as the pre-1343 Guelph 
25 
alliance had been for his brother . Matteo' s chronicle was 
characterized by a God who did not take fixed sides . God instead 
favored the side of virtue and punished wrongdoers rega:rdless of 
h h d b .. d 23 . d . . w 0 a een lnJure. H1S concept of fortune lffered from hlS 
brother's idea of a monolithic force that always brings down 
the mighty from power . Instead he saw fortune as a capricious 
force which, since it obeyed no discernible law, could not be 
understood. Fortune was seen as the force behind impulsive 
b h . 24 human e aVlor. Louis Green makes the important point that 
in viewing fortune as something that operates essentially random-
ly, and in attributirgindividual human actions to fortune, 
Matteo Villani allows individual events to be invested with 
h 
. . .. 25 t elr own causal slgnlflcance. Finally, Matteo Villani turns 
away from the Guelph identification of Florence as the basis 
for Florence's exalted status, and instead points to Florence ' s 
republican liberty, which he claims she had inherited from the 
Roman republic. Though this theme would later be adopted by the 
humanists, Villani's conception stemmed not from the humanists ' 
thorough conversance with Latin authors, but from the need to 
find a new political identity for Florence when the two pillars 
of medieval society, the Church and the Empire, were weakened 
.. . 26 
and at odds wlth the lnterests of the Florentlnes. 
A crucial link between the work of the trecento chroniclers 
and that of the quattrocento humanists is found in the work of 
Gregorio Dati, who composed his History of Florence in 1407-8. 27 
Dati, who like the Villani brothers was a member of Florence's 
merchant class,essentially confined the scope of his history 
to Florence ' s wars with Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, 
26 
and thus covered only the years 1380-1406 . Dati ' s conception 
of fortune stripped it completely of its association with divine 
intervention. For Dati, divine providence could still be a 
factor in history and s uspend the workings of nature . Fortune 
was man's own ability to intervene in natural events . 28 
Human passions, however, were given a de'herministic quality which 
detracted from Dati's abilityto make a three-dimensional analysis . 
While on one hand Dati attributes Giangaleazzo's ultimate defeat 
to his overly ambitious aims, "Giangaleazzo's ambition was given 
a s compulsive character which impelled hiin, irresistabfuy towards 
his doom in a way that recalls strikingly the self-destructive 
tendency of evil in Giovanni Villani's interpretation of history .,, 29 
Dati also compared the Florentine republic with ancient Rome, 
but, as had been the case with Matteo Villani, this identification 
stemmed primarily from praise of Florence's communal tradition 
and not from the literature of classical antiquity. 
There remains a l ink between Dati and Giovanni Villani 
in the attribution to God of considerable power in the unfolding 
of events. For Dati, h owever, God does not rule through i m-
mediate intervention, but as the ultimate cause of a material 
reality which is ruled by its own inherent tendencies. 30 Thus 
the trecento in Florence ends with historians who reflect an 
historical consciousness "still inspired by the primitive wonder 
out of which the apprehension of the order they assume had 
initially arisen," but who had prepared the way "for the s~para-
tion of the human world into a self-sufficient universe of its 
own in which historY •• • could become a new, more selective inquiry 
. ft . 31 lnto the natural causes 0 even s." 
27 
If the historiography of the fourteenth century belonged 
to the merchant-chronicler, in the fifteenth century it belonged 
to the humanist . Humanism was , above all a focus on classical 
antiquity. The term humanista was coined during the Renaissance 
itself, and was derived from an older concept, the studia humanitatis . 
This term generally referred to a liberal or literary education, 
and had been used in this sense by such ancient Roman authors 
as Cicero and Aulus Gellius. Italian scholars of the late 
trecento revived this meaning of the term, . and the studia 
humanitatis came to refer to a clearly defined curriculum which 
included moral philosophy, poetry, grammar, rhetoric and history . 
In all of these fields, humanism emphasized the reading and 
interpretation of ancient . Latin and in some cases Greek authors . 32 
This focus on the classics was important in determining the 
content of humanist histories. 
Humanists recognized two kinds of h istorical writing . 
The first was the chronicle, whose form had been ascendant in 
the fourteenth century . The second was the "true history," which 
33 was based upon classical models, especially the histories 
of Sallust and Livy, from whom the humanists derived their 
. . h . . . 34 F . exclUSlve concern Wlt polltlcal affalrs. rom classlcal 
historians the humanists borrowed certain stylistic conventions 
as well. The inclusion of elaborate battle narratives, the use 
of omens for predictive purposes(not for causal explanations) and 
the inclusion of set speeches to express the opinions of his-
torical figures and on occasion the historians themselves were 
all classical inheritances. 
Humanist historiography was also exclusively concerned 
28 
with heroic actions . From Tacitus, humanist historians l earned 
that " low people, things, or words" were beneath the dignity 
. 35 . . 
of hlstory. ThlS concern can be detected ln the preface of 
Leonardo BrunUHistory of Florence, which Bruni, as chancellor 
of Florence, composed between 1428 and his death in 1444 . 
Bruni writes : "I intend to write down the deeds of the Florentine 
people, their we·rghty struggles at home and abroad, their 
renowned deeds in peace and in war . ,,36 
Bruni, in focusing on the virtues of Florence in particular, 
expresses an aspect of what is now termed "civic humanism," a 
notion whose analysis by Hans Baron in The Crisis of the Early 
Italian Renaissance was an important contribution to the under-
standing of humanist historiography. According to Baron, the 
lone resistance of Florence to the expansive tyranny of Giangaleazzo 
Visconti encouraged Florence to portray herself as the inheritor 
and defender of the liberty of the ancient republics of Athens 
and Rome. In his Panegyric to the City of Florence, written 
in l403/4~in the immediate aftermath of the war with Giangaleazzo , 
Bruni writes o.1E.::':'.the war with Milan that "Florence knew that it 
was a Roman tradition to defend the liberty of Italy against its 
enemies.,,38 Praise for Florence as the heir of the Roman 
republic is an important element of Bruni's writing. This 
republican interpretation of history, according to Baron and 
others who accept his idea of civic humanism, could not have 
emerged fully until the Milanese wars accented Florence's 
republican glory. Mobilization of this opinion, however , had 
much deeper roots . It has also been pointed out that the 
hortatory nature of the Panegyric COUld have borne relevance 
29 
as the Fl orentines fought the final stages of their war with 
Milan . 39 The breakdown of the Guelph alliance, discussed earlier, 
vhich culminated in the Eight Saints ' war with the papacy, from 
1375 to 1378, and the absence of the empire from any significant 
role ln Italy, highlighted Florence's independent political role . 40 
That the humanist historiographers of the fourteenth century 
celebrated,the virtues of their polity can also be explained by the 
fact that as chancellors of Florence, they were in the employ of 
the Republic . They were thus unlikely to draw negative conclusions 
about the Florentine experience or its system of government . 
A second interpretation of quattrocento humanism has 
focused on the humanists as rhetoricians. Paul Oscar Kristeller 
sees the humanists as inheritors of medieval Italian dictatores, 
officials whose duties included the composition of letters and 
speeches and who also held chairs of grammar and rhetoric in 
Italian universities ~l The dictatores, Kristeller, writes, "were 
no classical scholars, and used no classical models for their 
compositions . It was the novel contribution of the humanists 
to add the firm belief that in order to write and speak well 
l't d d' 't h 't ,42 was necessary to stu y an lml ate t e anClen s.' Kristeller , 
in fact, asserts that the study of history was, for the humanists, 
subservient to their rhetorical studies : "History was not 
taught as a separate subject , but formed a part of the study 
of rhetoric and poetry since the ancient historians were among 
h ' , , d' h 43 t e prose wrlters commonly studle ln sc 001." 
Analysis of humanist historiography must take both the 
civic and rhetorical aspects of quattrocento humanism into 
account. In this light, the humanists' propagandistic use of 
30 
history becomes clear . The humanists saw history as a means 
by which their moral precepts could be illustrated and incul-
cated . Here was the rhetorical aspect of humanist historio-
graphy . Bruni's civic history combined rhetoric and a republican 
view of history, and emerged with an inspiring message for the 
citizens of Florence. We can see this association in the 
following speech, found in Bruni's History of Florence: 
As(the measures needed by the republic that are necessary 
for our liberty)are easy ••• and lie in your hands, who is 
so fallen that he would rather serve in pain and humiliation 
than be equal to others in right and honor? Our ancestors 
were not willing to Serve even the Roman emperors ••• When 
I remember your degenerate passivity I cannot be silent 
and calm. I only ask you to think of your awn liberty 
and w"elfare. 44 
This speech is put by Bruni in the mouth of Giano della Bella, 
a leader of the Florentine popolo against the city's merchants 
in a 1292 dispute. In its inspiring call to uphold Florence ' s 
age-old position as the defender of republican liberty, it 
combines the civic and rhetorical aspects of humanist historio-
graphy in a message which was as applicable to Bruni's fellow 
citizens in their ongoing struggle with Milan as it was t o the 
popolo of the late duecento. 
The humanists, unlike the chroniclers of the trecento 
whose l ivelihood had been Florence's commerc~al affairs, were 
generally professional scholars. Often, their search for 
employment was an important part of their writings . Bruni 
himself was not a Florentine; his home was Arezzo, and i t has 
been asserted that his Panegyric to the City of Florence, 
written in the very early years of the fifteenth century, was 
an attempt to secure the chancellory of Fl orence when it 
31 
fell vacant upon the death of the aging chancellor Coluccio 
Salutati, or at least to make a name for himself in the Florentine 
community . 45 Indeed, there is a strong noteof self-consciousness 
in the Panegyric: 
Once I had seen this beautiful city ••• I wanted more than 
I can tell to try its great beauty and magnificence . 
That is why I am writing this Qanegyric--not to curry 
favor or win popul ar acclaim. 46 
Above all, it is Bruni ' s commitment to Florence' s republi-
can hi:stit.ut.1 6rt~ that forms the basis of his moral purpose in 
writing history.47 He asserts that Florence possessed a civic 
virtus, a quality "dependent upon the freedom which allows citizens 
, , , ' h ' h" 48 to partlclpate dlrectly ln t e affalrs of t elr clty-state ." 
While the Florentine humanists held to a sense of cultural 
superiority based upon Florence's inheritance of the Roman 
republican tradition, quattrocento humanism ,was also character-
ized by a more general consciousness of the inheritance of 
Roman antiquity. There was a feeling that all Italians were 
somehow superior to the bar~barians of ultramontane Europe. 49 
This is evident in Bruni's History of Florence, in which he 
describes rather gleefully the defeat in 1401 of a German 
army, despite its employ by Florence herself, at the hands 
, , d' 50 of a Mllanese army made up of Itallan sollers. 
Armed with a civic-mindedness and a concern with rhetoric , 
how did the humanists go about writing history? As was dis-
cussed earlier, they borrowed from classical historians in 
focusing on important political events. In its concern with 
rhetoric, humanist historiography attempted to demonstrate 
how people should act, to teach by example . Writes Bruni in 
the preface to his History: 
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If we think men of advanced age are wiser because they 
have seen more of life, how much wisdom can history 
give us if we read it correctly; for there the deeds 
and thoughts of many ages are visible and we can 
readily see what to imitate and what to avoid, and 
be inspired by the glory of great men to attempt 
l ike excellence. 5l 
Another concern of the humanists was with causation in 
history. The views of Polybius are relevant here: 
The special function of history consists, first in 
ascertaining as nearly as possible the words actually 
spoken and second, in discovering the cause of the 
failure or success of whatever was done or said; for if 
only the bare facts about an event are narrated,it may 
provide pleasant reading but cannot be of any real benefit, 
whiJeif the cause of the event is duly added the study 
,£ .. of history becomes fruitful. 52 
The humanist view of causation in history differed substantially 
from the views of the trecento chroniclers. The role of divine 
providence was greatly diminished; the humanists saw history 
as the record of human activity, with human motives, and carried 
out by the force of human reason. The part p J!ayed by indivi.duals , 
parties and states was elaborated to a much greater extent 
h ' h b 'h" 53 t an lt ad een by earller lstorlans. History was seen as 
the struggle of individual character, or virtd(and Bruni ' s 
54 civic virtus), against external obstacles, or fortune. 
But for Bruni, fortune does not have the purposive quality 
found in Giovanni Villani's ehronicle, or, for that matter , in 
Livy, who simply assumed that fortune was on the side of the 
Romans in their efforts to dominate the world. Fortune in 
Bruni's History of Florence has no particular pattern, and it 
, '" 55 I th h ' rarely assumes major slgnlflcance. n general, e umanlsts 
emphasized man's role in forming political institutions and in 
'" ,56 polltlcal lnteractlon . 
33 
The humanists had learned from classical historians that 
a " true history" should be narrated in annalistic form, and many 
humanist histories digress to remind the reader of the passing 
years. In the History of 'Florence, Bruni makes partial use of 
the annalistic mode. One reason for the humanists ' diminished 
use of this style is that while the Roman republic had annual 
consular elections to serve as temporal reference points , Florence ' s 
57 political life had no such annual framework. Another 
reason, and a more important one, is that the rigidly annalistic 
mode did not always al l ow the historian to develop fully 
a theme. In narrating the story of the rise and fall of 
Walter of Brienne, Bruni makes an initial statement that the 
year 1340 is important, but then treats the four-year episode 
as a single unit within the annalistic framework. 58 Bruni 
narrates this period, which ends with the expulsion of Walter 
from his despotism, in terms of Florence's indomitable will to 
maintain its Itepub1ican liberty at a time when many other 
Italian communes were threatened internally by tyrannical 
regimes . 59 Bruni ' s concern was to teach a lesson with his 
narration of this period, and "if history teaches by example , 
. . . d . 60 the purpose of hl story does not requlre • • .concreteness ln etal1 • It 
It was permissible for Bruni to abandon the annalistic mode if 
it constrained him in his citric and rhetorical presentation 
of Fl orentine history . 
Bruni ' s brand of civic humanism could last only as long 
as Florence could use its republican institutions to back its 
boast of descent from the Roman republic. The humanist 
tradition continued, though, as Italian despots and even 
34 
ultramontane kings employed humanists in a variety of capacities , 
, d' h ff " h' , h 61 , lnclu lng t e role of 0 lClal lstorlograp er . An lllus-
tration of the historical work of this type is Angelo Poliziano's 
Pa~ri CQl1§pi-raG.Y, which was commissioned by Lorenzo de' Medici 
around 1480 and narrates the 1478 conspiracy by members of 
Florence's Pazzi family and Pope Sixtus Iv to murder Lorenzo 
and his brother Giuliano and to overthrow the Medici regime(Giuliano 
was indeed murdered, but Lorenzo escaped harm and the plot failed) . 
Poliziano simplifies hi s story and makes his sympathy and 
patronage clear by relating the story as the struggle between 
good and evil: 
All the Good People were on the side of the brothers 
Lorenzo and Giuliano ••• The Pazzi family was hated by 
citizens:c: arid common people alike, they were all extremely 
greedy, and none could stand their outrageous and insolent 
nature. 62 
Though the effective diminution of Florence ' s republican insti-
tutions under the Medici was seve~ Poliziano, as it suits his 
political purpose in the Pazzi Conspiracy, compares Florence 
to ancient republican Rome. He implies a parallel with the 
events of Sallust's Catiline Conspiracy, and indicates that 
since Rome had survived a conspiracy, so would Florence. 63 
Finally, Poliziano makes extremely selective use of facts to 
further the propagandistic value of his history. He entirely 
fails to mention Lorenzo's dispute with Sixtus over the city 
of Imola, whose control Lorenzo had won, but which each man 
h d 'h' 64 a wanted essentlally for lmself. 
The a ccuracy of fl1e humanists also suffered , at times , from 
their excessive concern with style. The self-perception of the 
humanist historian was not " as a collector of facts but as an 
35 
artist who organized the facts into a coherent and attractive 
65 form . to Poggio Bracciolini, who as chancellor of Florence from 
1453 to 1459 wrote a Florentine History, held a deep veneration 
for the classical tradition and a particular admiration for 
Livy. These concerns led him to focus more attention on style 
rather than on substance; form, not actual historical matter, 
f 
. 66 was a paramount lmportance. 
The humanist historiographic tradition did not survive the 
fifteenth century entirely intact. The French invasion of 1494 
was a jolt to the humanists' conception of Italian superiority 
and to their overweening faith in their pOlitical sagacity 
based on classical exempla. It also necessitated a sharpened 
interest in practical politics, since the invasions threatened 
directly the very existence of quattrocento civic liberty, 
whatever its constitutional form. The cinquecento was to see 
an historiography which, while it borrowed some elements of the 
humanist tradition, also diverged sharply from it. 
Quattrocento Florentine historical writing was steeped not 
only in the quattrocento admiration of classical antiquity, but 
in Italian politics itself. Throughout the fifteenth century, 
the workings of Italian politics were known and calculable to 
the intelligent observer; those who knew how to balance these 
. .. 67 ... forces were successful ln POlltlCS . Pre-humanlst hlstorl-
ography had proceeded, essentially, from the assumption that 
history was not within man's control, that fortune or God 
were the dominant elements. The humanists had asserted that 
man had the power to influence events, that I1by making use of 
experience he could impress efficiency and perfection on the 
36 
political order.,,68 The political events surrounding the 
invasions of Italy which began in 1494 were unprecedented, though , 
and action based on past observation and republican "reason" 
d d . . . 69 caul n o longer omlnate P011tlCS. 
The victory of French arms over Italian reason for control 
in the political arena meant that force, which had previously 
been given only a partial role in the determination of events, 
70 had to be seen as the decisive factor in political struggles . 
The Prince and the Discourses on Livy of Nicco1~ Machiavelli, 
the towering Italian political analyst of this period, maRe 
"an appeal to recognize the crucial importance of force in 
.. 71. . P011tlCS. " That the Ita 11ans had lost control of thelr 
political destiny also led them to search for an inscrutable 
element in politics. The motives of the ultramontane rulers who now 
controlled Italian events were as inscrutable to early cinquecento 
Italian historians as God's will had been to their predecessors . 
Within the arena of Florentine politics, they fell back on an 
analysis of the motives of the great states in terms of the 
"personal qualities and inclinations" of their rU1ers. 72 This 
sort of "psychological" analysis of pOlitical events would 
l ater be taken up by Guicciardini. 
The restoration of a republican regime in Florence in 1494 
had vast implications for pOlitical and historical thought. 
If history were to continue to instruct men in the art of po1i-
tics, it had to take into account the new tensions of 
Florentine political life . The humanist prescription for 
writing history proved inadequate for the immediate political 
analysis made necessary by the unprecedented nature of contemporary 
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political events , 73 : and historians of this period adopted new 
forms for the writing of history. The work of Piero Parenti 
took the form of a diary , with entries every two or three months . 
In it, Parenti took note of the Florentine political scene, 
discussing debate over laws, the conduct of magistrate's meetings , 
and shifting alliances among political leaders. In calling 
his work a Florentine History, he apparently felt that h e was 
74 still writing in an historical framework. The work of 
Bartolomeo Cerretani, whose Florentine History was publi$hed 
in 1512, was partially within the humanist tradition . In the 
first part of the work, he employs set speeches , and his intent 
is to " give good examples to readers ." But the second section 
of the work, much lengthier than the first , is a detailed de-
scription of Florentine politics from 1492 to 1512, focusing 
especiallY on events which took place in the councils of the 
. 75 republlc. 
Machiavelli, perhaps more than any other writier of this 
period, was aware of these matters of political immediacy . The 
questions he addresses in The Prince and the Discourses on Liyy : 
what form of government is best for Florence, the benefits of 
mercenary armies and the importance of force were questions 
that were being discussed as he wrote. 76 Politics was the 
tangible reality with which Machiavelli was concerned. He 
. . h , .. 77 saw polltlCS as an autonomous sphere of uman actlvlty, and 
employed history only insofar as it could provide fodder for po-
litical analysis . He felt that without a purely -empirical 
foundation all insight into the true nature of politics and 
comprehension of the laws behind political phenomena were 
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, 'b 78 h h ' h' , , , 1mposs1 Ie, t aug as we w1ll see , 1S " emp1r1c1sm" was not 
as resolute as it might have been when it could not fully 
illustrate the laws he sought to discern . History, then, 
subserved his aim of political analysis; he always moved from 
the description of historical events to more general considera-
tions. Each episode of history was seen as a manifestation 
of something which was unchanging: the perennial struggle for 
, h d '" 79 power, 1n ot er war s, POl1t1cS 1tself . 
Machiavelli had several aims in his writings . Foremost 
was his desire to earn himself employment in the restored Medic~ 
government of 1512. His service to the republic had made the 
Medici suspicious of his political leanings, and he had beeri 
expelled from government and even toruured by Medici leaders . 
After 1512, almost all of his writing was done for the e yes 
of those who were in a position to facilitate the resumption 
h ' '" 80 , of .. 1S career 1n pol1t1CS. In a letter wr1tten after the 
completion of The Prince in 1513 he expressed 
the desire I have that these Medici princes mould begin 
to employ me, even if at first it were only something 
menial; for if then I did not gain their favor, I should 
blame myself. And if they have read this work of mine, 
they would see that the fifteen years I have spent in 
the study of politics, I have not wasted or gambled away ; 
and anyone ogght to be glad to use a man who has gained 
a great deal of experQence. 8l 
Machiavelli was steeped in the humanist tradition, and 
his writings bear a relationship to those of the quattrocento 
humanists. One similarity is the civic nature of his work. 
In the Discourses, published in 1520, he writes , fl I believe that 
the greatest good one may do and the most pleasing to God is 
82' 
the good one does to one's native land. "-' He also felt that 
his work could be used as a guide to pol itics by the leaders 
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of the city . In his introduction to The Prince he bases his 
authority on "long experience in modern affairs and continual 
reading in ancient ones .,, 83 Like the humanists of the quattro-
cento, then, Machiavelli found classical wisdom applicable to 
the contemporary world. The Discourses are a commentary on 
the work of a classical author and contain a passage borrowed 
f P , 84 rom olyblUS . Many humanist histories had been commissioned 
by governmental leaders, both in Florence and elsewhere. 
Machiavel l i's History of Florence was also a commissioned work; 
it was undertaken in 1521 upon the request of Cardinal Giu1io 
de' Medici, later Pope Clement VII. Actually, it is somewhat 
prob1ematic~hy-~staunch republican , accepted a commission whose 
terms obviously included favorable portra~ of the Medici 
family. In writing the work, Machiavelli employed the humanist 
formulae for omens and battle narratives. Recently, Felix 
Gilbert has suggested t hat Machiavelli used the humanist 
form for set speeches to reveal, in disguised fashion, his 
, d" . 85 . .. . antl-Me lCl sentlment . Machlave111 attrlbutes to Plero de ' 
Medici(Lorenzo's father, not his son), as his death approached 
in 1468, the following speech to his supporters: 
I believed myself to be associated with those who would 
set some bounds to their avarice, and who, after having 
avenged themselves on their enemies and lived in their 
country with security and honor, would be satisfied. But 
now I find myself greatly deceived, unacquainted with the 
ambition of mankind, and least of all with yours; for, not 
satisfied with being masters of so great a city, and 
possessing among yourselves those honors, dignities and 
emoluments which used to be divided among many citizens, 
not contented with having shared among a few the property 
of your enemies, or with being able to oppress all others 
with public burdens, while you yourselves are exempt from 
them and enjoy all the public offices of profit, you must 
still further load everyone with ill-usage. You plunder 
your neighbors of their wealth; you sell justice; you 
evade the law, you eppress the timid and exalt the insolent ••. 86 
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Machiavelli, while describing such activites by those who 
supported the Medici and governed the supposedly republican 
institutions of the Medici government, fulfills the terms of 
his commission by exonerating Piero himself. He laments 
that Piero's "honorable designs" to check such outrageous 
behavior were frustrated by his death. 87 In combining certain 
aspects of humanist historiography with distinctly un-humanist 
criticis m of Florence, Machiavelli i s .t a son of humanism," but 
88 also "a prodigal son who never returned ." 
Machiavelli also departed from the humanist tradition in his 
views on the pabterns of causation in history, and on history 
itself. The humanists had seen history as a man-made process , 
controlled by the force of hUman reason . Machiavelli, however , 
saw history as operating in a predestined direction, not fully 
within man's control. In the History of Florence he posits 
a meta-historical framework borrowed from the work of Polybius : 
It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes 
to which they are subject, pass from order into confusion, 
and and afterward recur to a state of order again~ for the 
nature of mundane affairs not allowing them to continue 
in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest 
perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same 
manner, having been reduced to disorder, and sunk to 
their utmost state of depression, unable to descend lower, 
they, of necessity, reascend, and thus from good they 
gradually decline to evil, and from evil again to 
good. The reason is, that v~lor produces peace; peace, 
iiepose,;!rrepose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder 
order springs; from order, virtue, and from this, glory 
and good fortune. 89 
Despite his belief in this cyclical pattern of history, 
Machiavell i still gave hUman choice a role in political events . 
This idea, and his ideas on fortune are expressed in The Prince: 
Many have been and still are of the opinion that the 
affairs of this world are so under the direction of 
l:c fortune and of God that man's prudence cannot control 
"-' them ••• This opinion has been the more accepted 
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in our times, because of the great changes in the state 
of the world that have been seen and are now seen every 
day, beyond all human surmise. Nevertheless ••• I think. 
it may be true that fortune is arbiter of half our 
actions, but that she still leaves the control of the 
other half, or about that, to us. 90 
In describing how man might control fortune to the greatest 
possible extent, Machiavell i reverts to the role of force 
in pOlitics : 
I am of the opinion that it is better to be rash than 
overcautious because fortune is a woman and, if you 
wish to keep her down, you must beat her and pound 
her. It is evident that she all~vs herself to be over-
come by men who treat her in that way rather than by 
those who proceed coldly.9l 
Gilbert has speculated that this idea and Machiavelli ' s 
ideas on history's cyclical nature were to be the ultimate 
point of the History of Florence . Machiavelli narrates 
Florence ' s decline over a period of centuries, and in his own 
time Florence appears to be at the nadir of an historical cycle . 
Gilbert points out that the History is an unfinished work, and 
that Machiavelli presented to Clement VII in 1525 a plan to 
arm the people of the Romagna in an attempt to reverse the 
gains of foreign rulers in Italy. Gilbert writes that "it is 
not far-fetched to assert that Machiavelli wanted to end the 
:tB'ilorentine History as he had ended his other political writings : ••• " 
With t he idea that "the despe rate situation in Italy could be 
remedied if the Italians themselves took up arms.,,92 
Machiavelli the historian remains subject to Machiavelli 
the political analyst . In giving expression to his political 
ideas in an essentially humanist mode of historical writing, . 
his history loses loses some of its "historical" flavor . His 
history is diffuse; his focus is on individual episodes which 
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h 'd ' ,93 e conSl ers lllustratlve . In proceeding straight from facts 
to considerations of a more generainature, he neglects causation 
in history.94 His analysis of the Pazzi conspiracy provides 
an example. By way of insight, he writes that plots on the 
life of a prince 
rarely succeed, and most commonly involve the ruin of 
those concerned in them, while they frequently contribute 
to the aggrandizement of those agrinst whom they are directed . 
Thus the prince of a city attacked by conspiracy, if not 
slain(as had been Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan ten 
years earlier) •••. -... ~ almost always attainsto a greater 
degree of power, and w.ery often has his good disposition 
perverted to evil • . The proceedings of his enemies give 
him cause for fear; fear suggests the necessity of pro-
viding for his own safety, which involves the inj ury of 
others; and here arise animosities and not infrequently 
his ruin. 95 
Machiavelli, in deriving his lessons in politics from the 
events of history, did not scruple to fit facts to his i ' E 
theories, and in his choice of sources a nd events to narrate 
he sought facts which best illuminated his political ideas . 96 
Given this approach, he overlooks the specific motivations for 
the Pazzi conspiracy itself in his desire to glean from it 
more general truths. Even his highly admiring biographer 
critic:izes his historical writing for its insisten concern with 
politics i 
When people and events leave him indifferent as a man and 
as a politician, his narrative dozes off or moves by 
ciS c f1~tsiandistart$ ••. but ·' s t yle and thought revive · miracu-
lously whenever he divines beneath the garb of a Theodoric 
or even of a Walter of Brienne h :i's myth of a new prince. 97 
Machiavelli , remain~ above all, a political analyst, more 
, , 'h" , 98 comfortable derlvlng lessons from hlstory t an wrltlng It. 
This is due in part to his own ardent interest in politics , but 
this interest can also be seen as a product of the period in 
which h e wrote . He wrote as the struggles started by the French 
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invasion of 1494 were still being fought and when, in his 
awn estimation, political action could still save Italian 
liberty. It was only after the treaties of Barcelona and 
Cambrai, which confirmed Italy's domination by ultramontane 
powers, that such pOlitical writing lost its immediacy and 
history could once again be separated from it . It was to 
be the task of Francesco Guicciardini, writing in the 1530 ' s, 
to discuss the history of the invasions as an investigation 
into the natural causes of political events . 
CHAPTER III 
FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI 
Francesco Guicc.iardini{1483-1450)wrote his History of Italy .. 
in the last years of his life, after the events of the previous 
forty years had confirmed Italy's subjection to foreign rulers . 
In this work, he approached history in a novel way, developing 
a view of history that was unprecedented in the historiography 
of the Italian Renaissance . However, to assert as has one 
historian that Guicciardini'ss numerous earlier writings were 
merely "trial runs"l for his masterpiece is to ignore the 
development of an extraordinarily analytical mind in the context 
of early cinquecento Italian history. 
Guicciardini was born in 1483 into a prominent Florentine 
aristocratic family. He was trained as a lawyer and gave up a 
flourishing practice when he was called upon by the republic 
to serve as its ambassador to the court of King Ferdinand of 
Aragon. This appointment, in 1512, was t he beginning of a 
long political career. Unlike Machiavelli he was retained in 
the service of the Medici when the family was restored to power , 
largely because his family had traditionally remained aloof 
from the partisanship of Florentine politics . He remained for 
a short time Florence ' s ambassador to Spain, but then moved 
into the direct employ of the Medici popes . From 1516 to 1527 
he held a number of positions in the papal service; first as 
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governor of Modena, Reggio and Parma in papal Romagna, then 
as President of the Romagna, and finally as Lieutenant-General 
of the papal army which suffered defeat at the hands of E"mperor 
Charles V in 1527 . He was severely ostracized by the Florentine 
republic of 1527, but returned to government in 1530 as an 
adviser to the Medici dukes. He left government in 1527 and 
worked on the ¥istOl::,Y of ItalY until his death in 1540 . 2 
Guicciardini's varied career is reflected by his wri-
ting~ His points of view change throughout his career in a 
manner which takes into account the varied political scene of 
which he was a part. The despair that characterizes the History 
Of Italy reflects his reaction to Italy's sUbjugation to foreign 
rule and the political eclipse of the patrician class to which he 
belonged . 
No Florentine thinker of Guicciardini' s time was un-
affected by the tradition of quattrocento humanism . His 
education conformed clo;~e1:y to the humanist curriculum, though . 
the ancient writers8 he read most diligently were Rome's 
h ' , 3 lstorlans. Guicciardini was familiar with humanist political 
and historical theory and used it in much of his writing. While 
he did not adhere to a l l humanist principles, he used some 
of them selectively to shape his work. He clearly rejected the 
dominant element of humanist thought, the uncritical admiration 
of Roman antiquity: 
How mistaken are those who quote the Romans at every 
step. One would have to have a city with exactly the same 
conditions as theirs and then act according to their 
example. That model is as unsuitable for those lacking 
the right qUalities as it is to expect an ass to run like 
a horse. 4 
Implicit here is also a rejection of the humanists ' confidence 
in the use of past examples to guide conduct, and in the ability 
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of contemporary figures to draw lessons from the past, an 
aspect of Guicciardini's thought which will be addressed later . 
In his early History of Florence, Guicciardini borrows 
freely from the humanist tradition of writing history to reinforce 
civic pride. This work, written between 1508 and 1510, " conveys 
the sense that the author considers Florence the center around 
which events take form and from which events derive their 
meaning.,,5 Even after 1494, when Italian politics came to 
be dominated by ultramontane powers, Guicciardini still shapes 
his narrative around Florence's ongoing effort to recover control 
of Pisa. At this point in his career, Guicciardini approached 
his role as an historian in much the same way as had Bruni and 
Poggio; history was a civic monument and a celebration of 
civic virtue. 6 Like the post-humanist historians discussed 
in the l ast chapter, he also saw history as a vehicle of politi-
cal analysis . In the History of Florence, he analyzes Florence ' s 
history from 1378 to 1509 in terms of governmental forms, and 
emerges asanl advocate of oligarchical republicanism, an ideal 
restated in his later works that is perhaps the only position 
that remained a constant in his thought. 
GuGuicciardini came from a long line of Florentine patri-
cians . His early work derives from loyalty to his family as 
well as his his class. 7 He begins the History of Florence 
with the statement that "In the year 1378, when Luigi Guicciardini 
8 was Gonfaloniere of Justice, the Ciompi rebellion took place." 
He proceeds to narrate Florentine history with an emphasis on 
the achievements of its patrician leaders. The period from 
1393 to 1420 was the political heyday of the aristocracy of 
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Florence . About this period he writes that"'Florence was 
successful both at home and abroad; at home, because it remained 
free, united, and governed by well-to-do, good and capable men. ,, 9 
He w:asdisdainful of republican government by 1!.the people," whom 
he was later define as If t a ·s mad, wild creature, full of infinite 
errors and confusion, without judgment, loyalty, or stability."lO 
On the Florentine republic in 1497, he writes ·;·. that the government 
of the city "was in great disorder. The Great Council preferred 
to fill all offices with good and common people who would 
cause no trouble rather than with citizens who had more 
th 't d ' . ,,11 au or 1 y an experlence • Guicciardini is also critical of 
Nedici ascendancy in Florence, and l i!aments the erosion of 
, , 'h ' 12 llbertles durlng t elr rule. 
Guicciardini formally elucidates his principles for the 
government of Florence in his Discourse of Logrogno, written 
during his embassy to Spain. In this work, he proposes a govern-
ment for Florence on the Venetian model, with a gonfaloniere 
elected for life, a senate, composed of aristocrats, which 
would initiate all legislation and control the government's 
treasury, and a grand council with the power to affirm or 
reject the senate's proposals. This constitution, which is 
composed of elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, 
also corresponds to the ideas of Aristotle and Polybius and 
" " 'd ' h D' 13. dlffers llttle from Machlavelll' s 1 eal ln t e lscourses '.';and 
from his own proposal for a Florentine polity drawn up for 
Pope Leo X. However, Guicciardini bases his views on govern-
ment not upon admiration for classical antiquity, seeing them 
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, d ' , , 14 lnstead as a tf emand of ratlonal efflclency .tf 
In his Dialogue on the Government of Florence, written in 
1520, Guicciardini proposes once more this same formula for 
government in an historical analysis characteristic of the 
post-humanist tradition. This work contains none of the idealism 
or certainty of humanist treatises; rather, it analyzes politi-
cal personalities in terms of their "capacity to use the possibilities 
, h 'h " , , h' h h 15 ln erent ln t e polltlcal sltuatlorr'w lC t ey confront. He 
strips politics of the moral goals and imperatives prescribed 
by the humanists, and develops the concept of "reasons of state" 
to justify political action. In contrast with the studied 
ambivalence toward Lorenzo de ' Medici which he had shown in the 
History of Florence, in the Dialogue Guicciardini is highly 
laudatory of Lorenzo, whom he sees as having governed very 
b ' h ' , h f d 16 G' , d' , capa ly ln t e sltuatlons . e ace • U1CClar lnl was aware 
of the demands of politics; one of the characters in the Dialogue 
speaks of harsh measures taken by Florence against Pisa 
acknowledges that "he has not spoken as a Christian but according 
17 to the reason of state." While he was writing the Dialogue 
Guicciardini was serving the papacy as governor of Modena 
and Reggio, and his views were largely derived from his 
experiences there. In a letter written to Cardinal Giulio 
del Medici~~ during the same period, he describes his attempts 
to act justly in his post, writing that "I have not shown 
favor e xcept when forced to by needs of state . ,,18 
Despite his recognition of these "needs of state, " Guicciardini 
never longed for a prince who would serve as the redeemer of 
Italy . Instead he remained a staunch advocate of an', aristocraticallY 
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led republic . In his Considerations on the Discourses of 
Machiavelli of 1530 he writes that 
•• • if it were necessary to give a city a government e ither 
of nobles or of plebs, I believe it would be better to 
choose the nobles, for as they have greater prudence and good 
qualities, one may hope that they will evolve some 
reasonable constitution, whereas a people full of ignorance 
and confusion, and possessing ... many bad qualities, can 
only be expected to overthrow and destroy everything. 19 
This theme is recapitulated in the History of Italy, where 
Guicciardini writes that since "those citizens of greatest 
quality and esteem were held in less esteem than seemed proper ," 
the republic in 1497 had failed to make " provisions of moderation" 
(i.e. inclusi IDn of optimates in the government)which would 
"prevent the republic from being thrown into disorder by the 
. . d 20 19norance of the multltu e." Guicciardini remains a 
quintessentially elitist aristocrat. 
Despite Guicciardini ' s differences from p~evious Florentine 
thinkers, Guicciardini the political analyst must still ba 
placed withan the post-humanist tradition. His sympathies 
remained essentially republican, as opposed to the courtly 
sycophancy reflected by others at the time. His interweaving 
of politics and history was also commonplace in this period . 
It is Guicciardini's historical thought which reveals his 
departure both from humanist historiography and its Machiavellian 
sequel. 
"Smal l and insignificant beginnings," writes Guicciardini, 
" are often the origin of very great disasters, or even great g·ood 
fortune, hence it is extremely prudent to notice and ponder 
well everything, however small . Jt 2l This belief led him to see 
every event in history as causally significant . The systematic 
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study of cause and effect is an essential feature of Guicciardini ' s 
historiographical vision, and one that distinguishes him from 
his predecessors. Even in his early History of Florence, in 
his description of the Pazzi conspiracy, Guicciardini is con-
cerned with historical c causation and effect. He describes 
in considerable detail the conflict over Imola which aroused 
the enmity of the pope and the Pazzi family toward Lorenzo 
de' Medici . 22 He also seeks to understand how, when alternatives 
existed, Lorenzo's enemies came to decide to assassinate him 
in order to overthrow his government I 
In their discussion 6f t the best way t o realize their 
objective, the conspirators decided t hat a war against 
Florence would not be suitable, for it would take too 
long and would be too dangerous and uncertain. Besides , 
other Italian powers would surely come to the aid of the 23 
city. There was only one way, and that was to kill Lorenzo . 
Guicciardini shows a similar concern with causation in 
assessing the outcome of the conspiracy : 
This tumult nearly cost Lorenzo his power and his life ; 
and yet he gained so much :reputation and profit from it 
that the day may be called a lucky one for him. His 
brother Giuliano, with whom he would have had to divide 
his property and contend for power, was now dead ••. his 
power became such that from then on he acted as a free 
and complete arbiter, indeed almost as lord of the city . 
His power, which until that day had been great but 
suspect, was now supreme and safe. 
That is the way civil discora and strife end : the one 
side is exterminated, the head of the other becomes 
lord of the city. His supporters and adheI"ents, once 
companions, become almost subjects; the people and 
the multitude become slaves; power is passed on by 
inheritance and very often it passes from a wise man 24 
to a madman who then plunges the city into the abyss . 
There is a clear difference between Machiavelli's 
assessment of the conspiracy, described in the last chapter , 
and Guicciardini's account. Machiavell i begins his description 
of the conspiracy with a general statement about conspiracie& 
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their usual failure, and their results . He uses the specific 
example of the Pazzi conspiracy, devoid of details which would 
detract from his point, to illustrate the political principle 
in question. On the other hand, Guicciardini describes the 
events and then draws his more general conclusions, which, 
upon close examination, are not so general as they may seem. He 
refers specifically to Lorenzo's consolidation of power and 
its inheritance by Piero, whom he chooses to label a "madman." 
His entire account of the conspiracy derives "from his mental 
habit of looking at history with an eye for explanations : 
events are viewed as the results of a series of causes, and 
h h · 25 then as t e causes of a furt er serles of effects." A 
final difference is that while Machiavelli makes an implicit 
reference to the assassination of Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza 
twelve years earlier, Guicciardini makes no such use of 
examples. 
Indeed, Guicciardini holds none of his predecessors ' 
enthusiasm for the notion that history can, or should, teach 
by example. He constantly stresses the singular nature of 
each episode in history . In discussing the Italian reaction 
to the presence of King Charles VIUin Italy, Guicciardini 
mentions that Pope Alexander VI informed Charles through a 
papal legate that he desired to see the French king out of 
Italy at once, and the removal of the newly-installed French 
bureaucracy out of Naples. "Otherwise, " writes Guicciardini, 
he would have to appear personally before the Pope at 
Rome under those spiritual penalties with which the 
Church makes its threats . 
Such a remedy had been previously attempted by popes 
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in ancient times ••• But since there was now lacking 
that reverence and majesty which -the sanctity of the 
popes' lives had aroused in men's hearts, it was ridicu-
lous to expect similar effects from such dissimilar 
manners and examples. 26 
Another instance in which Guicciardini questions the use of 
past examples by historical figures is his treatment of the 
journey undertaken by Piero de' Medici in 1494 to negotiate 
with Charles VIII, whose armies had reached the borders of the 
Florentine contado. Piero based his trip upon his father 
Lorenzo ' s successful negotiations with King Ferrante of Naples 
when in the aftermath of the Pazzi conspiracy, the two powers 
had been at war. In the History of Florence, Guicciardini 
writes that Piero attempted to follow his father's example 
despite the fact that "this time the circumstances were 
different and the trip made little sense . ,,27 By the time 
Guicciardini finished his Ricordi(maxims ) in 1530, events had 
made him extremely unsure of man's ability to guide his action 
by past: exampl::e :~ple: 
It is entirely fallacious to judge by examples, for 
if they are not alike in every detail they are useless, 
since every slightest variation in the case makes 
a very great difference in the result, and to distinguish 
these minute differgnces requires a very keen and 
perspicacious eye. 2 
At this point in his life Guicciardini, while stressing 
the times are quite different from the past, still believes 
that it is within human capacity to discern these "minute 
differences" between situations. By the time he wrote the 
Hist_ory _ofItaly, he had abandoned even this possibility . On 
Piero's trip, he writes that 
governing oneself by examples is undoubtedly very 
dangerous if similar circumstances do not correspond , 
not only in general but in all particulars, and of 
other things are not managed with similar judgment, 
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and if, aside from all other fundamentals, one does 
not have similar good fortune on one's side. 29 
Fortune, indeed, plays a sizeable role in Guicciardini ' s 
History of Italy, as he found these events explicable in no 
other terms. He had long been inspired by his belief in man:' s 
power to control events and in his own talent to manage his 
affairs . Thereforethe events of 1527 were a shock to him,as 
well as to all who believed in the ability of Italian reason to 
control history.30 Moreover, the restoration of the ::reptiblic 
in Florence in 1527 was a personal disaster for Guicciardini. 
Because of this association with the Medici he sUffered a 
variety of indignities at the hands of the Republic. He was 
at first proscribed from service to the new government, then 
had much of his personal wealth confiscated by the govern-
mente 
The imprisonment of Pope Clement VII in the Castel Saint 
Angelo in Rome had been the event which caused the downfall of 
Medici rule in Florence and gave rise to the restored republic . 
In the History of Italy, this event is described with reference 
to fortUne. When Guicciardini has occasion, earlier in the 
work, to mention the pope when he was still Cardinal Giulio 
de' Medici, he notes that the cleric's ecclesiastical career 
. 31 
"was to prove a notable example of the vagarles of fortune." 
The loss of Italian liberty engendered by the 'outcome 
of the invasions produced in Guicciardini a profound sense of 
resignation and defeat. While in the History of Florence 
Guicciardini states only briefly the events surrounding the 
imprisonment of Ludovico Sforza in the tower of Bourges by 
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King Louis XII of France after Louis had made himself Duke 
of Milan, his comments on these events in the History of Italy 
reflect both the despair and the sense of irony, found e s-
pecia11y in the Ricordi, which-I't_alY's(:de:fea'L had instilled in him. 
Guicciardini writes that Sforza was sent to the castle of 
Bourges, 
which had been, two years earlier, the prison of the very 
same king who was now imprisoning him: so varied and 
miserable is human destiny and so uncertain to everyone 
are his own conditions in times to come. 3 2 
One historian has argued that the strongest impression 
-~-~"l .!. 
Gthcciardini meant to impart in the History of Italy .. is that of 
the helplessness and impotence of man in the face of fate .,,33 
While this impression is present, as illustrated above, to term 
it Guicciardini's major point is to overstate the case. There 
is no sense of inevitability in the events which lead to the 
foreign domination of Italy. Guicciardini opens each book of 
the History of Italy by showing that there was renewed hope 
for peace, although war always resumes and the increasing 
d ' , , d' , , 34 esperatlon of Italy's p1lght lS rea lly dlscernlb1e. 
Nonetheless, even as late as 1527, when the sack of Rome was 
imminent, Guicciardini had not abandoned hope. He is extremely 
specific in demonstrating how poor military preparation and 
Pope Clement's confidence in an untrustworthy commander doomed 
the defense of Rome against the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. 
Guicciardini exp1icitJ:y rejects a deterministic view of 
history. The workings of fortune are truly unfathomable and 
not subject to the one-dimensionality of fortune common to 
fourteenth-century chronicles or to a meta-historical pattern 
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such as Machiavelli ' s . Writes Guic~iardini: 
It is a great mistake to speak of the affairs of this 
world without distinction and absolutely, and, so to say, 
by rule; as every case is different and exceptional because 
of the variety and circumstances which cannot be judged 
by the same measure. Such distinctions and exceptions 
are not written in books but must be revealed by 
discernment. 36 
The "discernment" to which Guicciardini alludes is taken up 
in his study of causes and effects of particular events and, 
as will be shown below, his study of the motives of historical; 
figures . The rest he leaves up to fortune. 
In one sense, then,fortune plays a large part in Guicciardini ' s 
historical analysis. I n another sense , however, its role as 
an explanatory force is small. On the 1495 Battle of Fornovo, 
he writes: 
•• • the power of fortune is most great in all hUman affairs, 
even more in military matters than any others; where a badly 
understood command, or a poorly executed order, or an 
act of rashness or a false rumor, sometimes coming from 
even the simplesfsoldier, will often bring victory to 
those who already seem to be defeated; and where unnumerable 
accidents unexpectedly occur which cannot be foreseen or 
controlled by the captain's orders. 37 
In this specific instance, a sudden turn of interest among 
Italian soldiers from fighting the French to plundertf.il.g, their 
camp, and the contagion of this spirit through the Italian 
army, is attributed to fortune. On another occasion, the 
thick fog which hung over Rome before its sack in 1527 and 
thus made it easy for the foreign armies to capture the city 
is also explained in terms of fortune. 38 Guicciardini, in 
fact , questions fortune's true explanatory value within the 
text of the History of Italy itself. Charles VIII, in his 
conquest of the Florentine contado in 1494, was able to capture 
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the fortress of Sarzana despite its extremely strong fortifi-
cations. Writes Guicciardini : "It was ordained, wl'Ether by 
good fortune or at the orders of some higher power(if man ' s im-
prudence and faul:tin deserve such excuses) that a sudden 
. . 39 T . remedy would lntervene t o remove thlS obstacle. 1t wo lmportant 
facets of Guicciardini ' s thought can be discerned here. The 
first is that he attributes the military victory of the ultra-
montane ruler to Charles' own good fortune, not to the bad 
fortune of the Florentines . Guicciardini is clearly quite far 
removed from the exclusively civic orientation of humanist 
historiography and his own early work. The second is that 
Guicciardini expresses concern about the limits of fortune ' s 
explanatory power, questioning even his awn use of it. That 
"fortune is invoked only as a last resort" is "the result of 
40 his determination to see human affairs in terms of man." 
On the very first page of the History of Italy Guicciardini 
informs the reader that 
Numerous examples will make it plainly evident how 
mutable are human affairs, • • • and how pernicious, almost 
always to themselves but always to the people are those 
ill-advised measures of rulers who act solely in terms 
of what is in front of their eyes: either foolish errors 
or short-sighted greed. 41 
Mark Phillips makes the important observation that twentieth-
century historians seek broad explanations of major historical 
events, "and for that reason we may be inclined to see the 
princes as the scapegoats rather than the true culprits of 
history . ,,42 But Guicciardini, he points out, held a view of 
history based on particular factors, and especially upon 
personalities . "Psychology and self-interest," writes Phillips, 
"guide the flow of events in the History. For Guicciardini, 
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then, princely cupidity is a perfectly serious explanation 
and it is backed up by a clear picture of the psychology of 
43 
rUlers . " Describing Charles V in the aftermath of the Battle 
of Pavia, Guicciardini writes that 
As far as one could understand from external signs , the 
Emperor's actions appeared clearly to indicate a very 
moderate state of mind: a man not easily swept away by 
his good luck, an attitude that seemed incredible "' in 
so powerful and young a prince, who had never known 
anything but felicity.44 
Here , Guicciardini expresses surprise at moderation on the 
part of any i Nexperienced and victorious prince , especiallY 
• t h . h' h . . . 45 glven • t e lnsolence w lC commonly accompanles vlctorles . " 
Moreover, his use of the term "state of mind" illustrates the 
depth of his interest in the psychological explanation of 
events . Indeed, one of the great achievements of the History 
of Italy in the sphere of Italian historiography is Guicciardini t s 
establishment of "a close causal connection between history 
46 and human psychology'? " 
One feature of the mind-set of princes which Guicciardini 
investigates is ambition. To ambition he attributes a large 
role in shaping events . He says that King Ferrante of Naples 
desired peace in Italy before 1494 "despite the fact that 
quite often in the past he had revealed ambitions not con-
47 ducive to maintaining the peace," and describes Ludovico 
S 
.. 48 forza as "restless and ambltlouS ." Ambition continues to 
be a prominent cause of Italy's woes . According to Guicciardini , 
the :-.fundarrtental cause of the resumption of war in Italy in 
1521 , after three years of peace, was the " ambition of two 
most mighty kings ( Francis I and Charles V), puffed up with 
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with mutual jealousie~which incited them to exercise all 
their disdain in Italy.,,49 
Guicciardini does not think that ambition per se is a 
bad quality . The nature of a person' s ambition is the important 
factor; 
Ambition is not to be condemned, nor should one revile 
the ambitious man's desire to gain glory by honorable 
and worthy means. Such men as these do great and outstand-
;:~-::ar.d:.ng things, and anyone who lacks this urge is inc 1 ined 
rather to idleness than to effort. Ambition is pernicious 
and detestable when its sole end is power. This is 
usually true of those princes who, when they set it 
up as an idol to achieve what will lead them to power 
set aside conscience, honor, humanity, and all else. 50 
Anbbher o~ Guicciardini's primary concerns was motivations 
of actors in history, and he takes great pains to discover 
the reasons for their actions. Beforelte wrote the History of 
ItalyIhe wbrked briefly on a "Commentary"-;.vhwhich was to b e an 
account of his awn involvement in the affairs of 1525-27, 
and was later incorporated into the History of Italy!, In it 
he describes the purpose of writing history : 
The true value of history consists more in understanding 
the motives and the origins of things than in knowing 
the effects ••• What actually happened is well-known to 
everyone whereas the origins and motives are hidden . 5l 
A moment of reflection on what he had written must have led 
Guicciardini to abandon his commentary in favor of the History 
Ofltaly. Given his interest in "the origins of thingsU the 
work at hand would have been insufficient for his full under-
standing of t .he events of 1525-27; he felt he had to return 
to before the beginning of the invasions to seek an explanation 
for Italy ' s ruin. The interest in motivation expressed here is 
also plainly evident in the History . Seeking an-jexplanation 
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of Piero de ' Medici ' s decision to oppose Charles VIII ' s designs 
on the kingdom of Naples in 1494, Guicciardini attributes it 
to piero's belief that King Ferrante's stable hold on Naples 
could be a prop for his own control over Florence. 52 Although 
Guicciardini frequently ultimately attributes the actions of rulers 
to ambition or cupidity, he also trie-g· tbe understand their 
motives in terms of their specific designs and interests. 
Ludovico's invitation to the French is seen as princely folly, 
but Guicciardini extends his analysis and perceives Sforza's 
actions as part of an intricate design: 
•.• his plan was, once he had made himself Duke of Milan 
and brought the FrencharrDJY into Tuscany, to then interpose 
and bring about some agreement, whereby Alfonso would 
acknowledge himself tributary to the crown of France 
with suitable guarantees to the king, and after having 
dismembered perhaps the lands which the Florentines 
held in Lumigiana, the king would then return to France . " 
Thus the Florentines would have been beaten; the King 
of Naples weakened in force and authority; and he; 
Ludovico, having become Duke of Milan, would have 
achieved as much as was necessary to maintain his 
security without the impending danger of a French 
victory.53 
For Guicciardini, "personal interest is the mistress that 
d ' 54 rlves all men." He describes the peace in Europe in 1518 
and Pope Leo X's plan to bring together the rulers of Europe 
in a crusade against the westward-expanding Ottoman Empire: 
Everyone declared himself to be against the Turk and to 
be ready(if the others concurred)to lend all their strengths 
to so just a cause, nevertheless, since each of them 
considered the danger uncertain and very far off, and 
relating more to one state than to another, and since 
it was very difficult, and required a long time to 
introduce such a sense of zeal to so universal a union, 
private inEerests and advantages prevailed. 55 
Here Guicciardini' s idea that "self-interest-the satisfaction 
of the particolare--was basic to man's nature, and its only 
56 permanent element," is given application. Myron.' Gilmore, 
.-~ .~-
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in his general Renaissance history The World of Humanism. 1453-
1517, entitles the chapter of the period of the invasions of 
It "Th . I Ch'" 5 7 aly e Partlcu1ar nterests of the rlstlan Prlnces ." 
This could well have served as a subtitle for Guicciardini' s 
History of Italy, a work which "reveals a state of affairs in 
which the element of self-interest runs amuck on an inter-
. . 58 
natlona1 scale." 
Guicciardini ' s retrospective history of the invasions of 
Italy began as a work 9 entitled Florentine Affairs, in which 
he intended narrate a parochial, Florentine view of the Italian 
tragedy. By his later years he had realized that it would not 
be possible to treat these affairs without a much broader, 
Italian scale. 59 It has been observed that a reading of the 
History of Italy leaves open the question of the author's 
native city; Florence itself has a large but not disproportionate 
. th . 60 place ln e narratlve. In addition, Guicciardini brings 
into his work the affairs of all of Europe insofar as they 
affect occurrences in Italy: 
Perhaps it would seem beyond the bounds of my proposal 
not to deal with events occurring outside of Italy, if 
I make mention of what happened in France in that same 
year(1512); but because our concerns are affected by 
what has happened there, and because the successes of 
one are often conjoined with the successes and decisions 
of the other, I cannot pass over French events in 
silence. 61 
While in the History of Italy Europe may be a " thin, fitful 
62 . . d . . .. f th d t t d presence," GUlcclar lnl's recognltlon 0 e nee 0 ranscen 
the history of a single city-state is a great departure from 
the historiographic tradition he had inherited. 
There are other respects in which Guicciardini takes 
leave of the humanist and Machiavellian historiographic 
61 
prescriptions from which he emerged . Humanist historians 
made l ittle use of documentary materials, usually relying 
upon a single source of their choosing. Not believing that 
archives were particularJ;y useful for their purposes, they 
consulted only documents that were readily available to 
them. 63 Guicciardini, on the other hand, made use of 
documents throughout his career as an historian. He had 
used family archives in composing his History of Florence . 64 
In his Florentine Affairs he used fifteen previous histories 
as well as his father's papers and the Commissiori of Rinatdo 
degli Albizzi, a Florentine leader in the pre-Medici era . 65 
He had with him as he wrote the History of Italy the entire 
archives of the Dieci, the organ of Florentine government 
'b ,,66 responsl Ie for forelgn POllCY. His biographer writes 
that in composing the History of Italy, "Guicciardini used 
documents with a method more rigorous than any had done 
b h ' d d' 67 efore I m an few ld after . " 
Though Guicciardini surpassed humanist historiography in 
certain respects, he was also ~ery 'much in its debt. He 
intended to write a "true history;" on a page opposite the 
text of his original manuscript are excerpted the sentences 
h ' , , , d" 68 on lstorlcal wrltlng foun ln Clcero's De Oratore . In 
addition, one may speculate as to whether he would have 
adopted his broad Italian perspective and mentioned European 
affairs had not humanist s historiography emphasized foreign 
, 69 affalrs . 
Guicciardini, however, is clearly aware of the limita-
tions of a number of aspects of humanist historiography, and 
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modifies or qUalifies t heir use on frequent occasions . He 
uses the classical-humanist technique of inventing speeches and 
attributing them to historical figures, but on the first such 
occasion in the History of Italy he attributes the speech to 
its orator only tt in substance," admitting conscientiously to 
his readers that he has made up the speech.~O He uses the 
familiar annalistic form in the History, but the change of 
years is not given much significance when it does not correspond 
to important events, and his references to each new year 
rarely coincide with his division of the work into twenty 
- b 7 1.. separate ooks . 
Unlike the humanists , Guicciardini is relatively unconcerned 
with the literary qualities of his work . He writes in long 
sentences, but they are not the balanced and periodic sentences 
of his humanist predecessors. Indeed, his prose tends to 
"stretch continuity and attention to the breaking p oint ... 72 
The following sentence, in which Guicciardini describes the 
fears of Italian leaders in the aftermath of the Battle of Pavia , 
constitutes an entire paragraph ; 
They were less reassured by what many divulged regarding 
the good intentions of the Emperor, and of his inclination 
toward peace, and not to usurp the states of others, 
than terrorized by considering the great danger that he, 
moved either by ambition which ordinarily is natural among 
princes, or by the insolence which commonly accompanies 
victories, and spurred likewise by the hotheadedness of 
those who governed his affairs in Italy, and finally 
by the persuasions of his council and court, would on 
such anoccasion(which was sufficient to kindle the coldest 
spirit)turn his thoughts toward making himself lord of 
all Italy; knowing how easy it is for every great prince , 
and most of all for a Roman emperor, to justify his 
enterprises with .appearances that seem honest and 
reasonable. 73 
Plodding sentences such as these are not the result of 
63 
Guicciardini's inability to express himself clearly. On t he 
contrary, they reveal his desire to control his analysis and 
make the truths he discovers as precise as possible. 74 The 
humanist historiographers had been professional writers. In a 
work such as Bruni's Panegyric to the City of Florence or his 
didactic History of Florence, the force of the rhetoric, and 
hence the style, wer e central concerns. Machiavelli wanted 
to make his derived political laws memorable, so he wrote in 
a witty and acerbic style. Guicciardini ' s concerns were 
only accuracy and exhaustive detail. 
A frequent humanist ornamental technique was the inclusion 
of omens which preceded battles and other momentous events, 
which were used to foreordain theahBTIcffs of success or failure . 
Guicciardini himself employs this convention. During Charles 
VIII's preparations to invade Italy, Guicciardini relates, "in 
Puglia one night, three suns appeared in the sky." Thus, .. the 
very heavens" were involved in'predicting the future woes of 
Italy .,, 75 Clearly, though, Guicciardini -w: iews this literary 
device as excess humanist stylistic baggage; in his own 
mind he had rejected the value of extra-rational portents , 
Philosophers, theologians, and all the others who 
examine things unseen or beyond nature, talk all kinds 
of nonsense, because in fact men . are in the dark over 
these matters, and this investigation has served and 
still serves to exercise the intellect rather than to 
discover the truth. 76 
For Guicciardini, the truth lies not within the realm 
of the extra-rational, nor in the patterns which lie beneath 
the historical process , because no such patterns exist . He 
offers none of the lessons or prescriptions with which the 
humanists had infused their histories . One lesson he does 
64 
offer is a demonstration of the mutability of history, but 
this is seen as a given and not subject to human control He 
instead turns his narrative to the affairs of individuals, 
and is led to his conclusions about human selfishness and the 
folly of princes . In focusing his attention on the causes and 
effects of human motivation, "Guicciardini offers us the 
Explanatory force of the narrative itself, and the explanation 
of the Italian collapse is the History of Italy. " 77 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MIRROR OF FEUDALISM: 
FRENCH VERNACULAR HISTORIOGRAPHY, 1200-1477 
The French late medieval historiographic tradition differed 
greatly from the Italian historiography discussed earlier. 
Throughout much of the medieval period, however, the two tra-
ditions had been essentially the same. As was the case in Italy, 
early French historiography was the work of clerics writing in 
L . 1 atln. Moreover, it shared with its Italian counterpart an 
all-embracing, universal view of Christian history, concerned 
with "the lines of succession from the holy apostles and the 
periods that have elapsed from our saviou15's time to our own.,,2 
This type of history survived through the thirteenth century 
and beyond, but was eventually eclipsed by vernaCUlar histories 
which treated we11-circumscr:iibed areas rather than narrating a 
universal history.,;,3 This shift has been attributed to the 
"Ockhamist Crisis" of the fourteenth century, which called into 
question the applicability of all universal frameworks. 4 However, 
the tradition of French vernacular historiography began a 
century earlier, with Geoffrey of Vi11ehardouin's The Conquest 
of Constantinople, a history of the Fourth Crusade. Subsequent 
vernaCUlar histories took a variety of forms, but they had an 
important feature in common. They were for and about the 
noble classes of the feudal world. Perhaps, then, it is a 
65 
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rising self-consciousness among the feudal nobility which 
stimulated this new historiography, for, as will be shown later, 
the decline of the French nobility at the end of the Hundred 
Years' War marked the end of this type of history. 
This historiography was above all concerned with chivalry, 
which Johan Huizinga defines as "a sublime form of secular lL'ife .,, 5 
This emphasis is discernible throughout these works ; we read 
of gal lant feats of arms and fidelity to the feudal bond . 
Feudal knights were constantly at war. It was not only an 
obligation, it also provided diversion in an idle and mono-
, 6 d h' , , tonous llfe, an was 19h1y celebrated. In reflectlng thls 
feature of French life, medieval French historians glorify 
knightly bravery and virtues. Writes Huizinga, 
The conception of chivalry constituted for these authors 
a sort of magic key, by the aid of which they explained 
to themselves the motives of politics and history. The 
confused image of contemporaneous history being too much 
complicated for their comprehension, they simplified it, 7 
as it were, by the fiction of chivalry as a moving force . 
This point, however, must not be overstated. These authors 
merely reflected the goings-on in French noble society. Each 
of these authors also had his own reasons for writing history, 
and his work was colored as much by these particularities as 
it was by the chivalric ideal. In all cases, though, the under-
lying admiration for and celebration of chivalry is evident. 
Villehardouin's The Conguest of Constantinople, written 
in the first or second decade of the thirteenth century, has 
been the subject of much controversy among historians. 
Villehardouin, the Marshal of Champagne, was an important 
figure in the Fourth Crusade . The subject of his role in the 
decision of the crusaders to divert their mission from Syria 
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to Zara and to the Byzantine Empire, which resulted in the conquest 
of Christian territory by the crusaders, is a much-debated one . 8 
It seems, though, that Villehardouin di'd deliberately omit from 
his chronicle information about the decision tv divert the 
crusade which may have cast a negative light on his own role 
in the affair . 
Villehardouin, like many lay chroniclers, was a member of 
a feudal nobility which was largely unaware of Latin learning 
and the Latin universal history.9 Villehardouin's style derives 
largely from the popular forms of the chansons de geste and 
the traditional epic. The soldiers ~:dn Villehardouin's work 
fight not for eternal glory but for earthly merit, which derives 
from the fulfilment of thefauda~' chivalric ideal. lO His 
imitation of the epic form may be unconscious, as the entire 
crusading army may well have identified itself with the popular 
literature of the times and measured the ir successes and reverses 
. h . h 11 agalnst t ose of eplc eroes. In a device familiar to the 
reader of French epic works, Villehardouin frequently employs 
hyperbole in his description of the crusade f'.g "Neyer was so 
great an enterprise undertaken by any people since the creation 
of the world.,,12 Villehat"douin's style also reveal an affinity 
with the prose conte, an epic tale of imagined or real knightly 
h ·· . 13 h erOlCS, reclted by professlonal story-tellers. T e text of 
Villehardouin's work contains many devices widely used in the 
oral presentation of such epics . Transitional phrases such 
as "Now let us for this present speak of them no further but 
. . 14 I •• speak of the pllgrlms," or the omnlpresent antlclpatory phrase 
"as you will shortly hear" were commonplace in the prose conte. 
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The Conquest of Constantinople was not an imagined story, but 
the narration of an ~ctual crusade, and a failed one at that . 
Thus, as the narrative progresses and both author and reader 
are made increasingly aware of the failure of the crusade, 
Villehardouin's enthusiasm diminishes; Villehardouin changes 
his tone to a more strictly narrative one. 15 The book ends 
ap ruptlyand arbitrarily as the author can find no conclusion 
appropriate to the epic format . 
The prime mover' in Villehardouin's history was God. His use 
of divine will to explain events was formulaic and common to 
d h · 16 crusa e c ronlcles. The crusades were, after all, , holy missions , 
and to their own minds the crusaders acted with the protection of 
God . When the outnumbered French crusaders defeat a Greek army , 
Villehardouin writes . " ••• our Lord orders battles as it pleases 
him. By his grace and by his will, the ~ranks vanquished the 
Greeks. ,,17 Villehardouin did not, however, attribute all 
actions actions undertaken by the crusaders to God's will . 
Only those who were on the "right" side, in Villeh'ardouin ' s 
biased reminiscence of the crusade, were guided by divine will . 
Villehardouin argues that the crusade could not proceed to the 
holy land because some of the barons who had taken the cross 
sailed from Flanders instead of Marseilles , and thus the 
crusaders were unable to meet the terms of the contract they 
had undertaken with the Venetians, who were to transport the 
crusading army to the h oly land. God had nothing to do with 
the decision by these barons to sail from Flanders; Villehardouin 
attributes actions of which he disapproves to human failure and 
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• . . 1 8 . . .. , 111-advlce ." Thelr actlons were contrary to the dlvlne purpose 
of the crusade . According to Vi11ehardouin they failed Christen-
19 dam by sailing from northern ports. 
Their actions are also contrary to their feudal obligations, 
which for Vi11ehardouin are bound closely to religious ones . 20 
Thus Vi11ehardouin writes of these "misguided" crusaders: ..... i11 
did they keep the faith they had sworn to the count"(Ba1dwin 
of Flanders, one of the leaders of the crusade).21 Throughout 
T.he Conquest of Constantinople, Vi11ehardouin shows an obsessive 
concern with loyalty to feudal obligations. He mentions a group 
of nobles who went dire ctly to Syria ahd vowed to return, but 
22 
he makes no mention of their successes or failures. We only 
Tead that they did not return and thus failed to keep their 
oath • Vi11ehardouin defends the brutal sack of Zara, a Christian 
. t b f . t h . b' . 23 Cl y, Y re errlng 0 t e company' s compe111ng o11gatlons. 
The defeat of the crusading army in their siege of Adrianop1e 
is attributed to the failure of some segments of the army to 
h . b 24 h "keep to what ad been s~:tt1ed the nlght efore ." T e theme 
of faithlessness to the feudal bond(traison)was a frequent 
one in the epics whose style Vi11ehardouin borrowed, as was 
h h · . d . . b h h . 25 t e emp aS1S on reputatlon lscernl 1e t roug out hlS work . 
The failure of men is seen as the failure of the religious and 
feudal underpinnings of the chivalric ideal. When the booty 
from the final sack of Constantinople i s being collected, 
Vi11ehardouin writes: 
Some brought in loyall~ and some brought in evil sort(i . e . 
they kept some of the booty for themselves), because 
covetousness, which is the root of all evil, let and 
hindered them ••• Ah Godl how loyally t hey had borne them-
selves up to now. 26 
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Villehardouin, it is true, proceeds from the assumption 
that the sack of Constantinople, indeed the entire conduct 
of the crusade, was justifiable and divinely sanctioned. It 
is within this framework that he discusses the actions of those 
who took the cross . While he may not have consciously measured 
the actions of the crusaders against the codes of chivalry, the 
heroes of The Con9uest of Constantinople, if there are any at all, 
are those whos served God and fulfilled their feueal bond with 
the most loyalty and faith. 
Villehardouin's emphasis on the character of the feudal 
nobility, while clearly recognizable, is not overt . His work 
was predominantly a history of a military expedition, and an 
apologia for actions that certainly were called into question 
by many of his contemporaries. Later chronicles were more forth-
right in their emphasis on the chivarrous calling of the feudal 
nobility. An example of such a work is Jean of Joinville's 
History of Saint Louis, which is in part a personal crusade 
chronicle and in part a flattering portrait of King Louis IX 
of France . Joinville, like Villehardouin, was a noble from 
the Champagne region of France. He took the cross with King 
Louis in 1248 and returned to France in 1254 . In the 1270's 
he began to write a chronicle of the Egyptian crusade . The ~ 
scope of his work was expanded when in 1298, during the process 
of Louis;!; canonization, he was asked by the French queen Jeanne 
of Navarre to write a book containing "the holy words and good 
S · L . 26 deeds of alnt- OU1S." Joinville's History became a three-
part work . The first section is a portrait of the saintly j",,, ,' 
sovereign, the second is a narrative of the crusade itself, and 
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the third is a summary of able administrative decisions made 
by the king after his return to France . 
Joinville's chronicle, however, is l ess a work about Louis 
IX himself than it is about the noble class and the fulfillement 
b '" h 27 of the 0 llgat10ns of ch1valry by those w 0 took the cross. 
JoinvilEasserts at the outset of his History that this would 
be his concern(Oddly, the division he proposes differs from 
the structure of the finished work) : "The first part telleth 
how he ruled himself all his days by God and the Church, and to 
the profit of his realm. The second part of the book speaketh 
h ' . , h ' " 28 Of 1S kn1g tly empr1ses and hlB h1gh feats of arms." What 
emerges most plainly from the History of Saint Louis is the 
outlook ·of a French nobleman at the end of the epic era of 
the crusades . 29 The self-consciousness of the nobility, its 
aspirations, and the author ' s view of his class ' s place in the 
feudal world are discussed within the framework of a royal 
portrait and a crusade chronicle. 
Unlike Villehardouin, Joinville does not have a propa-
gandistic purpose in narrating the crusade itself. Therefore, 
he recounts the victories and defeats of the crusaders dis-
passionately. Villehardouin had to place the sailors from 
Marseilles in God's favor to emphasize the rightness of their 
conduct and justify the ir actions. While God, in Joinville ' s 
History, is not present every step of the \}way, He makes 
occasional appearances, though 'as a broad, general cause rather 
than in a specific sense. Joinville thus attributes his survival 
of numerous perils, including a last-minute reprieve when his 
execut ion by his Egyptian.:. captors seems certain, to God's grace : 
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"And these things will I have written that they that hear them 
may have trust in God in their afflictions and tribulations; 
and God shall aid them even as me.,,30 In Joinville's work, though , 
divine will is rarely invoked; unlike Villehardouin, he did not 
either thank God or lament God ' s will with each description 
of a battle won or lost . 
Joinville ' s focus, then, is primarily the actions of men 
and not of God, and the characters in Joinville ' s history are 
drawn so as to represent the eart.hly division of society into 
three distinct orders : the nobility, the clergy, and peasant 
and burgher class . For centuries these social classes and 
the calling which inhered in each had been described in these 
terms. The duty of the nobles, or defensores, was to uphold 
the faith with the sword; the clerics or oratores upheld it 
with prayer and discourses. The duty of the third class , or 
laboratores, was to preserve itself and perpetuate the classes 
above it. As Saint Paul had said, the duty of a Christian 
was to be aware of his place in the social ordo and conform 
to it " in the state in which he was called"(I Corinthians 7 : 20). 
For Joinville and for Louis IX, fulfilling the duties of their 
rank meant governing themselves according to the chivalric code , 
31 or being a prud'homme. 
Being a prud'homme was no mean task, for to be one a 
man had to maintain a balance between courage and prudence, 
honor and excess zeal, and worldliness and Christian piety. A 
prud'homme had to be both a warrior and a courtier, a man of 
. . . 32 S . both resolute Judgment and complete lntegrlty. erVlce to 
God was crucial for such a man . King Louis himself makes a 
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clear distinction between 
a brave man and a man of worth, a preux-homme and a 
prud'homme. For there are many brave men, knights in 
the land of the Christians and of the Saracens, that never 
believed in God or in his Mother. Wherefore I tell you ••• 
that God giveth a great gift and a great grace to the 
Christian knight whom he suffereth to be valiant in body 
and that he endureth in his service keeping him from mortal 
sin; and he that thus demeaneth himself should men call 
prud'homme, a man of worth, for this prowess cometh to 
him from God. And them of whom I have spoken may men 
call brave men, preux-hommes, for they are valiant, and 
fear neither God nor mortal sin. 33 
The code of a prud'homme, however, left no room for excessive 
zeal. TOG, much striving for preudomie yielded a lesser, not 
a greater sum of virtue. 34 Thus, according to Joinville, those 
who advised King Louis to undertake a new crusade in 1267 
. d' . 35 commltte a 'mortal sln." 
To be a prud'homme was to be aware of one ' s calling . King 
Louis and Joinville alike are conscious of their own noble 
rank and the obligations inherent in it . To a knight bested 
in theological debate with a Jew, Louis declares vehemently : 
And so I say to you that no man, unless he be a very 
good clerk, should argue with them; but the layman, 
when he heareth the Christian law reviled, should not 
defend it but by his sword, wherewith he should pierce 
the vitals of the reviler as far as it will go . 36 
Louis thus defined the calling of the clerical and noble 
classes ; on another occasion he presents his view of the 
calling of the laboratores. When Joinville admonishes the king 
that he should endure an ill-behaved but faithful groom because 
of long years of service, Louis replies, "He hath not served 
us, but we have served him when we have endured him about 
us. It 37 Thus it was a prblilege for the common people to serve 
the feudal class, and it was the responsibility of the 
prud'homme to recognize this social order . 
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In addition to being a manual of preudomie, Joinville ' s 
History is also a more rarefied celebration of knightly heroics 
and feudal loyalty. He celebrates a battle simply because it 
was fought according to the traditional feudal canons: "And 
know ye that this was a very fair feat of arms: for none 
shot with the bow or crossbow, but the strife was all with 
maces and swords between the Turks and our own fOlk.,,38 Indeed, 
the French nobility was, :tm:.-c~ling ' tot.this particular precept 
long after it became outmoded. As one historian as written, 
Joinville "is the ancestor of the French knights who lost the 
Battle of Poitiers because they would fight according to the 
. 39 code of chl. val ry. " 
Joinville ordinarily took a dim view of martyrdom. On 
one occasion he scorns the advice of a cellarer who expresses 
the opinion that "we should let ourselves be killed, for 
. 40 . 
then we should all go hence to Paradl.se." He can bubble wl.th 
enthusiasm, however, when even a cleric offers himself as a 
martyr on the battlefield. Describing the death of James of 
Castel, Bishop of Soissons, Joinville relates that 
When he saw that our men were giving way on the side 
of Damietta, he who had a great wish to be with God, nor 
desired to go back to the land wherein he was born, 
therefore made haste to go to God, and set spur to 
his horse, and attacked the Turks all by himself, who 
slew him with their swords, and set him in the fellowShip 
of God, numbered among the martyrs. 4l 
That Joinville praises such a wish for martyrdom by a cleric 
but ridicules that of a commoner is indicative of the class 
prejudice which he, as a member of the nobilitiy, harbored 
deeply. 
The History of Saint Louis also reflects a deep concern 
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for the feudal bond. While Joinvi11e l aments the death of a 
knight who had defied the king's orders and gone unilaterally 
into battle, he reports that the king, when informed of the 
incident, "answered that he desired not to have a thousand such, 
shoUld they disobey his orders as this man had done ... 42 Joinvi11e 
ultimately favors the king's viewpoint in this instance . 
When the time arrives for the crusaders to return to France, 
Louis declares that it is out of the question for him to "leave 
my folk in the hands of the Saracens and not do at least what 
I d · h 43 can to e11ver tern." In a final tribute to the king' s 
loyalty, Joinvi11e attributes to a cleric speaking on behalf 
of Louis ' canonization the statement that 
Ye may see that he was the most loyal man that ever lived 
in his time, will I tell you that he was so loyal that 
even with the Saracens "TNou1d he keep the covenant ••• 
that he had promised ••• by his word alone; and so it was 
that if he had not kept it, he would have gained five 
thousand crowns and more. 44 
Joinvi11e was more of a general observer than was 
Vi11ehardouin, who dogmatically argued a particular point of 
view. Moreoever, Joinvi11e's work was not exclusively a nar-
rative of a crusade, and he takes time to linger over the 
splendor of Louis' court . Describing the king' s court at 
Saumour in 1241, he discusses the seating arrangement at a feast, 
provides a brilliant image of the courtiers' colorful dress, and 
marvels at the attendance of a "full three thousand knights ." 45 
Joinvi11e also betrays a note of self-consciousness about his 
task as a chronicler. The fate of a certain crusader is 
i.mknown to him, and he informs the reader that "I made inquiry 
of those who were about him(~ " 46 In these last two respects 
Joinvi11e anticipates the work of Jean Froissart (1330 ' s-1404?), 
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"rhose Chronicle of France. England. Spain and Adjoining Countries 
is undoubtedly the outstanding French chronicle of the fourteenth 
century. 
Froissart ' s Chronicle covers the period from 1326to1400, 
a period in which "European chivar ry flowered in its final 
glory.,,47 The end of the crusades witnessed a diminution in 
the religious element of chivalry, so that Froissart, himself 
a cleric but also a poet, could write : 
All joy and all honor 48 
Stem from feats of arms, and from l ove . 
While courtly love makes few appearances in Froissart ' s Chronicle, 
which focuses . on feats of arms, it is the central focus of his 
extensive poetry. 
As courtly love rose to occupy an important place in the 
chivalric code describe by Froissart, God's role was diminished . 
The inclusion of the two was not contradictory; rather, Froissart 
wrote "as though he had too much respect for Providence to 
connect divine action in any way with the game of war and pOli-
o ~9 tics which so engrossed his contemporarles." Between the 
battles of the Hundre Years ' War and the internecine war 
endemic to late medieval France(a topic which will be addressed 
later) the French-nobility was constantly .! engaged in battle . 
Successes and failures in these wars were attributed by Froissart 
not to God but to fortune . The idea of fortune's role in the 
governance of affairs waxed greatly in fourteenth-century France 
as in Italy; the wheel of fortune, depicted even in the 
o 0 . 50 0 
stalned-glass wlndows of French cathedrals, reflected a Vlew 
of fortune ' s role expressed by Froissart in his poetry : 
She raises a man aloft; 
it matters not to her how 
She then overthrows him 
and casts him down with a 
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he goes; 
51 rude blow. 
On the very last page of the Chrqnic1e, Froissart comments on 
the instability of human affairs. In describing the fUneral of 
King Richard II of England, he writes: " Now consider well, ye 
great lords, kings, dukes, earls, barons and prelates, and all 
men of great lineage and puissance; see and behold how the for-
tunes of this world are marvellous and turn diversely.,,5 2 
In this passage, Froissart, by addressing himself to "those 
of lineage and puissance" reveals both the subject and intended 
audience of his work. He wrote for a variety of patrons among 
Europe's nobi1ity: gPhi1 ippa of Hainaut, the wife of En91and's 
King Edward III; Wenceslas of Bohemia; Albert of Bavaria, and 
Guy of Blois. Thus it is not surprising that Froissart re-
o 53 0 0 flects the outlook of the arlstocracy . H1S Vlew of the 
nobility was cosmopolitan, he admired not just the lords of 
a single nation but the entire feudal aristocracy of Europe . 
Indeed, Froissart ' s view of society refl ects the bias 
of the nobility. He includes Wat Tyler's rebellion in England 
in his narrative only "in order that gentlemen and others may 
take example and learn how to correct such wicked deeds. " 
John Ball, one of the leaders of the peasants ' rebellion, is 
described as "crazy; " Tyler himself is " a bad man and an enemy 
of the nobi1ity.,,54 This is not simply aristocratic disdain for 
commoners, though . The rebels were revolting against what the 
nobility perceived to be the divinely ordained pattern of 
. 0 55 soclety. Froissart's social attitude may also be illustrated 
by a comparison of his treatment of two unpleasant occurrences, 
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the destruction of a city and the death of a knight . The 
sack of Limoges by the English in 1370 is narrated with utter 
detachment: 
•• • Then there were to be seen pillagers in active mis-
chief. It was a melancholy business; all ranks, ages and 
sexes cast them on their knees before the prince(Edward 
the Black Prince, the English leader)for mercy; but he 
was so inflamed with passion that he listened to none 
of them, all were put to the sword . 56 
Froissart simply cannot become excited about the death of even 
several thousand burghers; the destruction of their city is 
but a "melancholy business". On the other hand, upon the death 
of Sir John Chandos, Seneschal of Poitou, whose :::: death moved 
his followers to fight "like madmen," theE,Etristoo.;t:"atiL~ Jchronicler 
attributes ·, to them the following lament: "Oh Sir John Chandos, 
flower of knighthood, cursed be the forging of that lance 
that wounded thee. u57 For Froissart, nobles are more real as 
people than are members of the lower orders of society. 
Froissart ' s primary interest is in gallantry and knightly 
heroics . The Hundred Years' War was for him a protracted 
pageant . Froissart himself was a Fleming, serving both 
English and French patrons, and supporting neither side . He 
is not hinterested in the political rights and wrongs of the 
o d h 0 dO 58 war, bu:b:: lnstead "favore gallantry w erever lt was . lsplayed, " 
and wrote his Chronicle "to the intent that the honorable 
and noble adventures of feats of arms, done and achieved by 
the wars of France and England, should notable be enregistered 
59 and put in perpetual memory." He seems bored with topics not 
directly relevant to his theme . Before discussing the 1385 
peace treaty between the count of Flanders and the city of 
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Ghent, which ended seven years of bloody conflict, he writes, 
"I shall beg of you to have the goodness to attend to me while 
60 I report how peace was brought about.1t Peace was nothing 
more than a tiresome interlude between battles. 
Froissart ' s visit to the court of Gaston of Foix provides 
much material for the Chronicle . When Gaston tells him," ••• my 
fair son, more gallant deeds of arms have been performed within 
the last forty years, and more wonderful things have happened, 
than for three hundred years before," Froissart continues:, " 
if I have hitherto dwelt on gallant deeds, on hard-fought 
skirmishes and battles, and told how castles, forts and towns 
were attacked and taken, many more will f0110w.,,61 Froissart ' s 
ideal, of course, is a conflict such as the 1367 Battle of 
Navaretta, fought by Edward the Black Prince in an effort to 
restore King Peter of Castile to his throne, which had been 
usurped by by his brother Henry . In this battle both sides 
excel : 
The loss was immense on both sides and the mighty deeds 
which were done there are too numerous to be told. The 
Prince shone pre-eminently, and proved well .. his noble 
birth, and the gallantry of his knighthood, by his eager-
ness to fight the enemy; on the other side King Henry 
acquitted himself right valiantly in every situation. 62 
In a work largely devoid of religious content, focusing instead 
iT 'J mi i tary 
on military prowess Froissart can, and does, praise the 
Saracens for their fine military organization and discipl ine, 
writing that "the flower of infidel chivalry was in their town . .. 63 
Froissart is obsessed not only with warfare and chivalry, 
he also celebrates the trappings that accompany them. His 
purpose is to entertain the nobility. He wants to recreate 
for his readers the splendor of the figures and events 
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descr i bed in his Chronicle . His recording of visual impressions 
h
. .. 64 
as been llkened to "a sequentlal, panoramlc ' take' II On 
the preparations for the Battle of Navaretta, he writes " that 
nIt was a beautiful sight to see them approach with their 
brilliant armor glittering with the sunbeams. It was delightful 
to see and examine these banners and pennons with the noble 
army that was under them . n 65 Just as Froissart is concerned 
with his characters ' appea~ces and not their motivations, it 
is the outward appearance of events, not their meaning, which 
receives his attention . Describing the preparations made by 
King Charles VI for his unrealized invasion of England in 1386, 
Froissart lists no less than forty-two items of arms and 
pr6visionsreadied for the channel crossing, including cheese 
bowls, ointment, utensils for the buttery, spurs, fat pigs, and 
66 "every article necessary for man and beast . " 
Froissartts patient cataloguing of the objects accumulated 
by the French army can also, to a certain extent, be attributed 
to his desire to record the efficacy of the French king's 
preparations. The exhaustiveness of his list also reveals his 
rnvn seriousness of purpose . Froissart strove for accuracy 
and objectivity . Thus, on one occasion, he writes t 
Let it not be said that I have corrupted this noble 
history through the favor accorded me by Count Guy of 
Blois, for whom I wrote it. No, indeed I for I will 
say nothing i but the truth and keep a straight course 
without favoring one side or the -other. 67 
Froissart's desire to write an accurate chronicle impelled 
him to travel extensively. He spent several months in Scotland 
and Brittany, visiting castles and battle sites, and speaking 
. ... 68 
to numerous lords and knlghts about thelr experlences ln combat . 
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Thus, Froissart jumps a t the opportunity to visit Gaston of 
Foix. His stay with Gaston will be very fruitful , since 
"knights and squires from all countries assembled at his 
:: t .,69 cour • 
Notwithstanding Froissart ' s self-conciousness as an 
historian, which led him to seek accuracy and numerous oral 
and written sources in the composition of his Chronicle, his 
work leaves the reader with little "sense of history." His 
descriptions of battle do not change over the seventy-four 
year period he covers, and grow. tedious. The characters he 
c e lebrates never learn, they simply accumulate a ~owing record 
of "high feats of arms.,,70 Froissart betrays no sense that 
the society he celebrates was rapidly changing, indeed on the 
verge of extinction. P.S . Lewis has recently argued that to 
a great extent the Hundred Years ' War was as much a civil war 
of the French kingdom as it was a national war between England 
and France. 71 The issue which underlay the Hundred Years' 
War concerned the French king's theoretical sovereignty over 
his kingdom. In its most pronounced manifestation, this 
conflict was initially a struggle between Edward III of England 
and Phillip VI of France , not so much over the crown of France 
but over the long-disputed question of Edward's sovereignty 
h " , 72 over 1S cont1nental possess1ons. The legitimacy of Edward' s 
feudal claims gave many French nobles the opportunity eo back 
the side by whose victory they stood to gain the most. Indeed, 
many Fren,h nobles supported the English kings throughout the 
course of the war. 73 In both a military and political sense, 
how"ever, the nobility depicted so glowingly in Froissart t s 
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chronicle was a social order in decline . In England, the concept 
of the "feudal army" had been supplanted by the more extensive 
use of paid professional military companie& and the noble style 
of battle was decisively altered by the long bow. In France, 
customary feudal warfare lasted longer, but the conditions of 
its service differed little from that of the professional 
companies. 74 By the 1440's Charles VII of France had created a 
national army; the political consolidation of the realm would 
not be complete, however, until Louis XI and Charles VIII 
quelled the unrest of the duchies of Burgundy and Brittany, 
long the French crown ' s two most powerful vassals. This crisis 
of the military order of society is reflected in Froissart's 
Chronicle .. Gone from his conception of chivalry is the emphasis 
on feudal honor which had characterized the work of Villehardouin 
and Joinville; military undertakings had become much more 
particularistic and their celebration refers almost exclusively 
to the military prowess which they displayed, not their service 
to a suzerain . 
If by the turn of the fifteenth century the medieval notion 
of chivalry and the historiography which c e lebrated it had 
grown overripe , the last gasps of these forms, after the 
Hundred Years' War had ended and "the day of the medieval nobility 
was over,,,75 showed that these institutions had grown fully 
rotten. 
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the customs of 
. . 76 chlvalry were observed only at the courts of prlnces. The 
last two dukes of Burgundy, Philip the Good (1419-1467) and 
Ch arles the Bold (1467- 1477), employed historians who served 
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as narcissistic mirrors for the anachronistic aspirations of 
these still-powerful vassals of the French king. Courtly 
splendor was celebrated as never before. Olivier de la Marche , 
w·hose copious Memoirs span the period from 1435-1502, devotes 
over one hundred pages to the wedding celebration of Charles 
the Bold and Margaret of York. 77 Georges Chastellain, the 
Burgundy dukes' official historiographer from 1455 to 1 475 , 
call Duke Philip~_: "France ' s most magnificent prince since 
Charlemagne," and "the most renowned duke the world has seen 
in a t housand years . " He writes that "none of the Roman 
emperor/?, eeven the best among them, had erer been surrounded 
with as much ceremony, honor, and reverence as he was.,,78 
Huizinga considers the work of Chastellain to be the supplanting 
79 of truth by a "fairy-story," a work of fantasy ahd splendor. 
La Marche's description of the "Pheasant's Banquet" held 
at the Burgundian court shows the dukes ' continued sense of 
self-importance at its most pronounced. The nobles of the duchy 
vow, with Philip "that if it please our most Christian and 
victorious king (Charles VII)to take the cross ••• lshall 
80 personally serve with him in this holy crusade." The entire 
Pheasant's banquet is a showy, empty, charade, a "magnificent 
.. .. 81 lllustratlon of verbal fantasy poslng as actlon ." As Paul 
Archambault writes: 
The Burgundian word was a surrogate deed, providing 
both a sense of accomplishment and a il excuse for 
inactivity •.• One measures the height from which the 
thirteenth-century ideal of preudamie has fallen when 
one recalls King Louis' remark to Joinville that 
h~retics are to be refuted not by subtle ar~uments but 
wlth a deep sword-thrust through the belly.82 
Both Chastellain and La Marche and their patrons clung 
to a reality which in truth no longer existed . The feudal world 
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of Joinville ' s time ahd long been eclips ed by the lnexorable 
consolidation of the French monarchy. The new reality was 
perceived by Philippe de Commynes, who knew "men and their 
motives too well to impute to them high-minded, dispassionate 
ideals," and instead "saw them as they are, not as he would 
have liked them to be . tf 83 It is to his work that we now turn. 
CHAPTER V 
PHILIPPE DE COMMYNES 
Philippe de Comrnynes (1447?-15ll)had more political ex-
peri4RCe~ than any of the French chroniclers discussed in the 
last chapter, more even than Machiavelli, and the extent of his 
career indeed rivals that of Guicciardini's. His Memoirs, the 
first s ix books of which cover all but the first three years 
of the reign of King Louis XI of France and were written from 
1487 to 1491, and whose last two books are an account of King 
Charles VIII's expedition to Italy and were written from 1495 
to 1498, provide an , insider's view of French royal politics in 
the last quarter of the fifteenth century. Commynes' virtual 
abandonment of chivalry as a "magic key" for understanding 
history brought French historiography "up to date," as it were , 
in the way in which it reflected French society and politics . 
Commynes was a minor Burgundian nobleman who entered the 
service of Duke Charles the Bold in 1464 . He served Charles 
as an adviser and chamberlain until he switched his allegiance 
to King Louis XII whom he served in a similar capacity and as 
an ambassador, until the king's death in 1483 . He sat briefly 
on the young King Charles VIII ' s council of regency, but fell 
from favor and was for a short time imprisoned by Charles' 
elder sister and regent Anne of Beaujeu when he participated 
in the intrigues of Louis of Orl~ans(later King Louis XII ) 
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against the young king . His fall was the occasion of the writing 
of the first six books of the Memoirs . In 1494 he found himself 
back in royal favor and accompanied Charles on his expedition 
to Italy. After completing his Memoirs, he retired to his 
estate at Argenton, where he died in 1511. 1 
A central issue in all consideration of Commynes is his 
switch of allegiance from the duke of Burgundy to the king of 
France . One historian has termed Commynes' desertion an act 
of treason which is minimized in the Memoirs by his description 
of such acts as commonplace. 2 To an extent, the Memoirs present 
evidence of Commynes'sense of guilt about this act . He mentions 
the act of his desertion of Charles only casually: "About this 
time(wfiich was in the year l47~ )I entered the service of the 
k ' ,,3 lng ••• That he makes very few references to it afterward, 
and none at all in his discussion of Louis Xl's habit of luring 
people into his service, is quite striking . Also, he refers to 
himself only as "some friend of the king" when he describes 
his secret assistance of the king before his switch in allegiance . 4 
A less critical historian has questioned whether Burgundy 
was a country against which one could, in theory,comrnit treason, 
and adds that as king , Louis had always been Commynes' ultimate 
suzerain. 5 Howeyer, Comrnynes himself extends the concept of 
treason to encompass more than desertions of a regional sovereign,6 
, 7 T and on one occaSlon terms Burgundy a country. here are other 
occasions when the accuracy of Comrnynes' description of his 
own questionable conduct is called into question. To his 
cOllusion with Louis of Orl~ans he makes only two implicit 
8 references. The only reference to his imprisonment is made 
in the context of a discussion of Louis Xl' s notorious iron 
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cages, when he glibly says of the king ' s building of these 
facilities for his prisoners:ttA number of people have cursed 
him since then, including me, for I tried one of them out for 
9 a period of eight months under our present king." On another 
occasion Commynes lies outright about this matter when he 
declares that nobody rose up against the newly crowned King 
Charles . lO Commynes ' Memoirs clearly reflect self-consciousness, 
perhaps even an unsettled conscience, about these two treacherous 
acts of his public career . 
Why, then, if it disturbed his sensibilities, did Commynes 
abandon ChDlrles the Bold to enter the service of the "spider-king? " 
One reason was that he was poorly paid by the duke. Louis, on 
the other hand, offered him a huge pension, a sizeable estate, 
and a wealthy bride. ll Probably a more compelling reason, though , 
was Commynes estimation of the two rulers. Charles was proud 
and self-reliant, and refused to heed Commynes ' counsels against 
the duke's continued war-making. Commynes was conservative 
and opposed to violence , and a central message of his Memoirs 
-4.s that 
one should be0wary of making a battle unless it is 
unavoidable, and, if it becomes absolutely necessary, 
then all things should be seriously considered before 
starting. And most of the time, those who act cautiously 
and use good foresight obtain better results than those 
who proceed with great arrogance. 12 
Commynes clearly respected the king's calculating methods more 
than he did the duke's lust for battle. 13 Charles sought on 
the battlefield the same honor and glory which received such 
naive praise in earlier fifteenth-century chronicles; it 
was noted in the last chapter that Chastellain and La Marche 
spent their careers in service to the dukes of Burgundy. Commynes , 
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however, took a dim view of this by-now moribund conception. 
When the duke's English ally asks him to cease his aggression 
against Germany, Commynes writes that "he could not bring 
himself to do this, however, claiming that his honor would be 
trampled underfoot if he left, and offeril'lg other lame excuses . ,,14 
Commynes ' conception of political affairs reflected his aware-
ness of the decline in political relevance of the chivalric 
ideal . It his distillation of this new reality that gives his 
Memoirs their trenchancy as a work both of political theory 
and of historiography. 
Commynes ' new approach to politics e ntailed a new approach 
to history. His break with previous French historiography, 
however, was not a complete one. On a stylistic level , 
the conceptions of his predecessors can be recognized in the 
Memoirs. Commynes ' use of an expression such as "as you will 
15 hear," hearkens all the way back to Vi11ehardouin and the 
prose conte. Commynes also glorifies an event's legendary 
connotations . Of the army with which King Edward IV of England 
crossed the channel in 1475, he writes, " Never since the days 
of King Arthur had any king of England taken so many men at 
16 once to the other side of the sea." France in Commynes' day 
was still organized strictly along feudal lines; thus he shares 
with his predecessors the societ~l convention of referring to 
any nobleman superior in rank to himself as "my lord." Commynes 
more clearly expresses his own feudal outlook in describing his 
service to Louis XI during the king's illness in 1479: "I 
waited on his table for fifteen days and attended his person 
like a va1et-de-chambre, which I considered a great privilege 
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and was bound to do. " 
The Memoirs also reflect the same class prejudices evident 
inin previous histories . Commynes tells of a minor friar who 
"had a private audience with the pope, which was a great honor 
for such a small man,,,18 and takes it amiss that Louis should send 
his barber to negotiate with Mary of Burgundy, calling him 
"a minor personage, who was unsuited for the management of so 
important an affair. "IQ In a limited way, the tradition of French 
historiography is still visible on Commynes' narrations of 
milit"ary affairs. He could still write that Charles the Bold 
J . . .. . 20 assemble a "traln of artlllery flne and mlghty for the tlme," 
and on another occasion relates that the duke' s army "made a 
beautiful sight for those who were still at the rear to behold .,, 2l 
After a battle undertaken by Charles, Commynes mentions that 
120 men were lost, but only mentions by name the highest-ranking 
h .. 22 h b d casualty of t e day's flghtlng. Deat, met no ly, coul 
still be praiseworthy. Of plans by the citizens of Li~ge to 
sally forth and kill both Charles and Louis, who were encamped 
near the city during its siege in l468,"he writes that "They 
were confident that they would obtain great victory, or if 
. d h 23 wors"e came to worse, a most glorlous eat ." Commynes 
also still recognizes the sanctity of the feudal word of honor, 
despite its inconsistency with his own behavior. When Charles 
the Bold betrays the Count of Saint Pol, an acknowledged enemy, 
into the hands of the king, Commynes writes : 
all the excuses which I could muster up in this case 
could not extenuate the disloyal and dishonorable act 
which the duke committed when he sent a good and valid 
safe-conduct to the ( count)and nevertheless siezed him 
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d d h
' , , ,24 
an sol 1m for purely avar1C10US mot1ves . 
On another occasion Commynes relates that when in 1475 Louis 
XI made peace with the English, "the duke became incensed; -; . • 
and referred to several brave deeds of former kings of England 
who had invaded France and the pains which they had taken to 
acquire honor there.,,25 The invocation of chivalric honor 
here is not Commynes' own, however; it is the hotheaded duke ' s . 
This temperament, and its manifestations in Burgundy's conduct , 
had been part of of Commynes' reason for deserting Charles in 
1472. 
I f Commynes ' Memoirs can be placed stylistically in the 
tradition which preceded them, the author clearly broke from 
this tradition as well . His work is relatively free of visual 
ornamentation . He occasionally mentions that a particular castle 
is beautiful, but even his most elaborate visual description, that 
of Venice, where he spent eight months as Charles VIII's resident 
26 ambassada::; is not protracted . He describes Charles the Bold 
as "very ostentatious in his dress and in everything else-
a little too much.,,27 While for Froissart this would have 
occasioned an elab~rate and colorful description of the duke ' s 
wardrobe, right down to his drawers, for Commynes Charles' 
dress was merely pretense and a prince's peccadillo. Commynes 
also does not automatically venerate rank: "There are some lords 
with income of less than thirteen silver livres who are proud 
to say: 'Speak to my servants' and by this they think that 
. 28 
they imitate very important people . " Omitted entirely 
from the Memoirs is any mention of Commynes' selection by 
Charles as one of the twenty-five Burgundian knights who 
participated in a ceremonial joust on the occasion of his 
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marriage in 1468 . Indeed, ''Cornmynes had no use for the decorative 
. h h 29 aspects of knlg t ood." Finally the prose 
of the ~emQ_irs is quite removed from the elegant style o f 
Froissart and Chastella in, 1vho were both poets and wrote 
with the intent to entertain. By the end of the following 
paragraph of the Memoirs, in which Commynes describes the 
contents of a letter h e wrote to two members of the Venetian 
council, the reader can easily have forgotten the original 
idea being related: 
In accordance with what we had decided, I wrote to them 
the substance of what I had told the major-domo; (I said 
that)I had found occasion to continue my office as a good 
mediator, as I had agreed to do at my departure from 
Venice, and that this was most agreeable to the king and 
seemed to me to be necessary, too, for there are always 
enough people around to trouble affairs, but there are 
few who have both the occasion and will to reach agreement 
about a great dispute or who are willing to endure all the 
words that are spoken by those who transact such affairs; 
for in such armies many different opinions exist. 3D 
Here , Comrnynes' style of writing is much more comparable t o 
that 'of Guicciardini than it is to that of any of his French 
predecessors. 
Commynes ' concerns , too, reflect his abandonment of the 
feudal-chivalric ideal. His interest, as will be discussed 
later in greater detail , is in practical conduct, irrespective 
of imposed patterns for behavior. Thus he treats, though 
sparingly, the administrative capacities of Louis XI. He 
. . hm . t . 31 notes the klng ' s establls ent of a natlonal pos al serVlce, 
and describes his efforts to centralize the monarchy. I t was 
the king's "singUlar desire, u writes Comrnynes, 
to be able to establish a new policy in this kingdom, 
principally in regard to delays in legal proceeding, and 
in this respect to put strong contro~s over the court of 
Parlement •• • He was also very anxious to see used in this 
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.1 ; kingdom one customary law and a single system of measures, 
and to have all the customary laws written in French and 
put in a beautiful book, so as to circumvent the ruses 
and robberies of lawyers, which are so great in this 
kingdom that none other can compare with it in this respect .•• 
If God had granted him the grace to live another five or 
six years without being too handicapped by illness, he 
would have done much good for his kingdom. 32 
Commynes' description of the 1465 Battle of Montlh~ry, in which 
Louis' army held its own against the League of the Public Weal, 
gives a clear indication of his concerns. The feudal formali-
ties characteristic of war led to catastrophe, as did Charles 
the Bold's hasty cavalry charge, or they are immaterial; Commynes 
does not eulogize the numerous lords killed there. It is not 
customary chivalric valor described coloristically, but the 
wit, skill, and tactics of the various commanders that 
33 interest Commynes. 
Commynes undertook his Memoirs not as an independent work, 
but as a testimony which Angelo Cato(1430's-1496), a Neapolitan 
humanist who entered the service ofLruis XI in 1476 and who 
was rewarded with the Archbishopric of Vienne, planned to 
. . .. h' . 34 lncorporate lnto a Lat1n h1story of t e k1ng's re1gn. 
Thus Commynes' . original intention was only to provide the 
archbishop with "an account of what I have known and heard of 
the acts of King Louis XI~ .. 35 Commynes on occasion praises 
the king excessively; in a semi-eulogistic pass-age describing 
the gravely il l king he writes that Louis was "so wise that 
one could not go wrong with time, provided that one simply 
obeyed what he commanded, without adding anything of one's ,, 36 own. 
In order for Commynes to exculpate himself from wrongdoing in 
entering Louis' service it was necessary for him to portray 
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the king favorably. In general, though, his praise for Louis 
is more modest. In describing what he considers errors in 
judgment on the king's part, he writes: 
Chroniclers commonly write only things which reflect 
credit on those whose actions they record, and they 
omit many things .• • • it is good to think that there is no 
prince so wise that he does not err once in a while. 37 
Comrnynes clearly hopes that his supposedly objective OutlOOK 
on the king's character will be reflected in Cato ' s reliance 
upon his testimony in composing his history. 
Comrnynes did not see himself as an historian in the for-
mal sense. He acknowledges that "I am not observing the order 
of writing used in histories, and I am not mentioning the 
years o f' the exact times during which the events took place .,, 38 
Indeed, Commynes'Memoirs are fraught with chronological errors 
and mistaken names and places . He himself is aware of these 
failings, and on one occasion begs the reader ' s forgiveness 
39 for, he says, "I wish only to make no errors as to sUbstance ." 
Note, however, that he leaves the validity of his judgments open 
to question: A.fter one of his frequent didactic asides on the 
conduct of diplomacy, he writes that "I realize that there are 
many persons more qualified than myself t o speak about 
it, but at any rate this is what I would do.,,40 
Commynes ' self-consciousness about his historical 
technique stems from his view of himself as both a participant 
in and an outsider to the French historiographic tradition. 
In his pursuit of causal explanations and his search for meaning 
in history he far surpasses his predecessors. Among French 
medieval historical writers he was " one of the few, if not the 
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only one , to bring a critical mind to bear on the narration 
41 of events . " 
Con~ynesl causal analysis of events operates on two quite 
distinct levels. In the first , God is a distant arbiter of 
earthly events, playing the determining role in a mellla-.lilist.:o<r::Lcal 
soneme2.w1n..iJ"(i.!h allows no prince or kingdom to become too powerful : 
All things considered, it seems to me that God has 
created neither man nor beast without establishing some 
counterpart to oppose him, in order to keep him in 
humility and fear ••• To the kingdom of France he has 
opposed England; to the English he has opposed the 
Scots, and to the kingdom of Spain, Portugal ••• To the 
princes of Italy ••• God has opposed the communes of 
Italy ••• which are often against the lords, and the 
lords against them, so that neither may grow. 42 
This scheme also operates in a more specific manner . Both 
princes and principalities are the recipients of their just 
deserts at the hands of God. The death of the wicked King 
Richard III of England is thus seen as "the true judgment of 
God.,,43 Commynes' attribution to God of a role in his "quasi-
h . .. . . . 44 d t h mec anlstlc Vlew of equlllbrlum" correspon sot e momentousness 
of the changes he describes. The fall of Burgundy was of 
enormous importance to Commynes, thus he asserts not once, 
but several times, that the decline of the duchy of Burgundy 
after Charles ' death was "equal to their former measure of 
felicity.,,45 For Commynes, "historical events, such as 
divine compensation, human revenge, political balance of power 
and the tragic collapse of men and kingdoms are merely 
d 
. 46 
complementary arcs of the pen ulum of hlstory." 
Commyne s attributes many of his ideas to has master Louis . 
Thus he vtrites that "King Louis had a saying, and in my opinion 
a wise one, according to which when pride rode before, shame 
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47 and destruction were soon to follow closely ." Machiavelli 
had borrowed the ideas ofPolybius in formulating his meta-
historical scheme, which operated by the force of its own mo-
mentum. Commynes, on the other hand, was not nearly so well 
read in ancient literature, though he refers in certain in-
stances to ancient histories . In tone and in theory, however, 
the meta-historical ideas of the two writers are ultimately 
not so very different. 
With God as a factor in his causal framework, Commynes 
can a l so posit a religio-moral framework for historical 
causation. Rather deterministicallY, he attributes mis-
fortunes of rulers to their lack of piety.48 This note i s 
struck in his account of the fall of Charles the Bolds 
I have not seen any reason why he should have incurred the 
wrath of God, unless it was because he considered all 
the graces and honors which he had received in this 
world to have been the result of his own judgment and 
valor instead of attributing them to God, as he 
should have. 49 
Ultimately, it is this framework, with its balancing concept 
of divine justice, that Commynes uses to explain the outcome 
of the affairs narrated in the first six books of his Memoirs . 
Throughout the work Commynes expresses his disapproval of 
the scheming intrigues of England ' s notorious RKingmaker," 
the Earl of Warwick, and the Count of Saint ? ol, whose attempts 
to playoff Louis XI, Charles the Bold, and England's King 
Edward IV against one another result in rare agreement among 
the three princes in their common desire to see him dead, is 
also condemned by Commynes for his conduct. Commynes sees 
the death of these two characters as punishment at the hands 
of God . This religio-moral framework, in which people are 
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rewarded for virtue and punished for vice , receives its final 
recapitulation upon the death of King Louis . According t o 
Commynes, 
God had granted him some grace, for just as he had created 
him wiser, more liberal, and more virtuous in all things 
than the other princes who ruled with him and in his 
time, so thaibt.he surpassed them in l ev§l rything, so also 
he surpassed them in length of life. 50 
The second level on which God operates in Commynes ' concep-
tion of historical causation concerns not the great changes in the 
status of princes and peoples, but ~ontingencies in day-to-day 
affairs . Whenever events transpire in a manner contrary to 
what is anticipated, Commynes discerns the hand of God. Thus 
he writes of Mary of Burgundy's decision not to marry into 
a French house, "God • •• decided to bring about another marriage , 
and we probably still do not know why he willed it so . ,,51 
Besieging Li~ge in 1468, Charles the Bold won a great victory 
despite the fact that his troops were outnumbered and their mo-
rale was low. Charles ' victory " came to him solely by the 
grace of God, against all human odds.,,52 These invocations 
of divine will to explain events diffen :rnarkedly from the 
examples given earlier. In those instances, the events de-
scribed are in keeping with Commynes'overarching conception 
of divine justice, and he places them in that context . In 
the latter , examples, though, Commynes does not refer to this 
theme . Charles' victory is contrary to t he ultimate resolution 
of divine justice which favors Louis XI and brings ruin upon 
the duchy of Burgundy, and Cornmynes~. finds Mary's marr iage 
not relevant to it. In these instances, the 'Yeactions of God 
cannot b e placed in any framework; Commynes sees them as beyond 
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human understanding . A Machiavelli or a Guicciardini would 
have attributed these e vents to an impersonal quirk of fortune . 
Commynes, however explicitJ:y rejects fortune as an explana-
tory agent. On the fal l of Saint Pol, he writes: 
One might say that fickle fortune had turned aga i nst him. 
However, to be more correct, one should say that such mys~ ~r 
teries do not derive from fortune; besides, fortune is 
nothing more than a poetic fiction, and it must have 
been God who had abandoned him. 53 
While in this case, in which , events correspond to Commynes ' 
"divine justice" pattern, one would not expect Commynes to 
attribute the outcome to any force other than God, he rejects 
fortune entirely as an explanatory aid, and attributes the 
unexpected outcome of Mary's courtships to God . despite 
the event's irrelevance to his religio-moral framework . 
Commynes' dependence on God and rejection of fortune 28 
for causal explanation can be attributed to a variety of 
factors. One, his relative lack of familiarity with classical 
learning, has already been mentioned. A second, posited by 
two recent historians , takes into account Commynes ' own 
career. Writes Paul ArchambaUlt, "Only in prison, smarting 
54 over his social and political fall from grace," :J4 could Commynes 
have written that despite man's efforts, God concludes things 
55 at his own pleasure. Samuel Kinser perceives after Cornmynes ' 
imprisonment "a turn toward piety in a man who until then may 
have been accustomed to thank only his own talent and sharp 
sense of occasion for h is spectacular career, I, especially 
since "this assertion s tands in such discontinuity with his 
didactic emphasis on the necessity for calculation and watch-
fulness in pOlitical life •• , 56 
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While not rejecting this latter argument, I should like 
to suggest another possible interpretation of Commynes ' causal 
analysis of the events he narrates. A comparison of his views 
on causation in the two distinct sections of his Memoirs reveals 
subtle yet substantial differences in his use of God's will, 
human action and fortune to explain, on the one hand, the events 
of Louis Xl's day and on the other, the Italian expedition 
of Charles VIII. 
It is important to note that Commynes does not explain the 
events of either section of his Memoirs exclusively in divine 
terms . While attributing to God the final outcome of events 
in England's Wars of the Roses, Commynes also discusses in an 
extremely pragmatic fashion the machinations of the Earl of 
TAT • 57 narwlck. While the demise of the Count of Saint Pol is 
accounted for in Commynes' religious framework, as described 
earlier, Commynes also views the disesteem earned by the count 
as a function of his own behavior. He describes the count ' s 
elaborate posturing to his own exclusive benefit, writing 
"thus you may see in what position he had placed himself among 
these threee gteat men. " 
58 
Thus it is not without precedent that Commynes expl ains 
events in human terms in the latter part of the work . As we 
will see, though, he relies much more heavily on hUman explanatlOtl 
in describing Charles VIII's Italian expedition than he does 
in describing Louis Xl ' s reign. 
Onee of the tasks of the historian is to seek order in 
the historical events he narrates. We have seen that Commynes 
posits an overarching divine framework to explain the reign 
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of Louis XI . His description of Charles VIII ' s undertaking 
also finds him attempting to seek such a framework for his 
narrative. The peg on which Commynes hangs the second section 
of his memoirs is the concurrence of the words of the Dominican 
friar Girolamo Savonarola and the course of the French expedi-
tion to Italy. Savonarola was a dynamic orator who attracted 
an extremely large foll-owing after his arrival in Florence 
in 1490. He preached against the corruption and abuses of the 
Church and against the tyranny of Italian rulers . His 
prophecies of the imminent appearance in Italy of an avenger who 
would reform the church by force of arms seemed vindicated when 
Ch arles VIII crossed the A~ps.59 Commynes was not unaware of 
Savonarola ' s role in Florentine affairs; in fact the two men 
met on two occasions . It is in a very l imited sense, however, 
that Commynes uses S<a:vonarola' s vision as an organizing principle . 
While he points out that Charles'Italian expedition was pre-
dicted in Savonarola's prophecies , 60 he never extends this con-
cept to account for Charles' decision to invade Italy or the 
king ' s initial successes in terms of divine will in accor-
dance with the friar's words. Commynes does, however, explain 
Charles' successful retreat from Italy by referring to X 
Savonarola's answer to an inquiry Commynes made before Charles 
prepared to return home . Commynes relates that 
I asked him whether the king could pass(out of Italy) 
without danger to his person, in view of the large assem-
bly(of soldiers)that the Venetians were making ••• He 
replied t o ame that he would meet with some 
difficulties on the way, but •.• that God, who had 
led him when he came, would lead him again on h i s 
return. 61 
Throughout his narration of Charles ' retreat from Italy, Gbmmynes 
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refers to this prophecy to explain the king ' s narrow escapes 
from perilous circumstances. For example, when the French 
successfully traverse a treacherous mountain pass at 
Pontremoli, Commynes writes 
•• • it seemed that what Brother Girolamo had told me 
was true: that God led him by the hand until he was 
safe; for it seemed that his enemies were blinded and 
stupefied, since they were not defending the pass. 62 
Commynes himself is astounded at the French army's survival 
of numerous close calls in its retreat from Italy. The predictions 
of Savonarola give him an opportunity to make comprehensible 
these events. While pl acing Charles' retreat within this 
overarching framework, though, Commynes cannot sustain the use 
of this scheme. He recognizes that the prophecy on which 
Savonarola ' s successes had hinged, the reform of the Church in 
63 Italy, was not achieved by the French expedition to Italy. 
He is also decidedly neutral in his ultimate assessment of the 
f riar . After describing Savona'rola' s ignominious execution 
for heresy in 1498, he writes ; "I do not know whether to excuse 
him or accuse him, and I do not know whether they did well to 
. . 64 I have hlm dle. II Commynes inability to schematize fully 
under a divine rubric his narration of the events in the second 
section of his Memoirs, especially the failures of the French in 
Naples, leads him to rely much more heavily upon human actions 
and to introduce, though sparingly, fortune to explain events. 
While in explaining the French loss of Naples his overarching 
conclusion is that "God had entirely withdrawn from the king 
the grace which he had granted him on the 
65 journey to Italy, " at the same time Commynes attributes 
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the loss of the kingdom to irresolution on the part of the French . 
Charles neglected to send his army sUfficient funds to keep 
it manned because "his servants who were involved with this 
had little experience and they were l azy . ,,66 Commynes also 
sees too much discussion and too little action by the French 
67 army as instrumental in the loss of Naples. Finally, he 
relates that after the French had retreated from ItalY, King 
Charles "confessed freely that he had made many mistakes 
68 there, and he enumerated them." Commynes thus explicitly 
and decisively gives human action a role in the loss of the 
kingdom of Naples. 
This section of the Memoirs also finds Commynes no longer 
averse to assigning fortune a role in the shaping of events. 
When Piero de' Medici left Florence in 1494 to negotiate with 
Charles and ended up being ousted from power, it was because 
"on that day he began to tempt fortune.,,69 While at first the 
French were sucx:::essful and welcome in Naples, the year 1495 
saw great changes: "Throughout the kingdom people began to 
change their minds and fortune began to change when two 
70 months before it had been the contrary" Here Commynes uses 
fortune not so much to explainr:lincomprehensible events, as 
would Guicciardini, but more in the sense of a "wheel of fortune," 
varying cyclically. It is likely that his willingness to 
invoke fortUne results from the failure of the French in Naples . 
The first section of the Memoirs are an account of the successes 
of a French king, thus he could write that "God takes a special 
't t' h' 'd 71 1n eres 1n t 1S k1ng om." In light of the French failure 
in Naples, this assertion could no longer be made, thus fortune 
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enters into his causal scheme. 
Wh ile Commynes' explanations of both Franco-Burgundian 
affairs and the French expedition to Naples employ divine and 
hUman causation , the human agent is more tangible and more 
explicit in the latter section of the Memoirs. Mo~eover, 
Commynes makes use of fortune to explain events . Perhaps 
these difference can be attribute to differences in the 
events themselves, and in Commynes' assessment of the~ . 
Commynes clearly sees the reign of Louis XI in a positive 
light . Louis was very successful both in dealing with his 
enemies and a n the administration of his realm. Commynes' 
framework for divine action and divine justice is in keeping 
with the king ' s successes, as it is with the actions and misdeeds 
atrributed to Warwick, Charles the Bold, and the Count of 
Saint Pol. On the other hand, Charles VIII's expedition to 
Italy, which Commynes opposed from the outset, was largely 
a failure. Its human and material cost to the French was 
high and nothin~ ultimately, was achieved. Commynes's earlier 
scheme of historical explanation cannot be made consonant 
with these events, and the outcome of the expedition and 
Savonorola ' s ultimate fate do not allow him to elaborate fully 
his narrative in terms of the friar's preachings. Thus he 
speaks of the highly transitory assignment and withdrawal of 
divine grace, quite similar to the Italian concept of fortune, 
and on occasion invokes the concept of fortune himself. In 
addition, he spends more time explaining events in terms of 
hUman factors. He sees no consistency in the course of the 
French invasion of Italy; thus his causal scheme is fragmented 
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and disjointed. 
Commynes, in part, explained events in terms of hUman 
actions. He was also an ::bbserver of human character, and made 
human psychology a part of his narrative. Charles VIII, accord-
ing to Commynes, "had his heart set" on the Italian expedition. 72 
In describing the antagonism of Louis XI and Saint Pol, 
he speaks of the king's "uneasy frame of mind," and goes on 
to say that "if the two persons of whom I am speaking had many 
worries, the king of England and the duke of Burgundy, for 
their part, had no fewer.,,73 These, however, portraits of 
purely internal emotional states. Commynes displays a still 
keener pyscho1ogica1 ability in relating such e~ptiona~ states to 
external: appealianCes. ap<;ie actions. When King Louis recei.ves an!. 
English herald with the intent ofpIOposing a peace treaty between 
England and France, Commynes writes that "many people were 
anxious to hear what the king would say and to see what sort 
of expression he would have on his face when he came out of 
th . 74 d d . d . . e lnner room," an conc1u es thlS ramatlc eplsode by 
describing the king's emergence from his meeting with the 
herald: "His face appeared to reflect great confidence, and 
he showed no trace of fear, for he was very happy about the 
. . h . . . d d' h h h 75 receptlon WhlC hlS proposltlons ha foun Wlt t e era1d. 1f 
On one occasion, Commynes' psychological insight is truly 
astounding. He writes that while many French nobles appeared 
happy and relieved upon the death of Charles the Bold, in 
actuality they were uneasy about the prospect of the king' s 
increased power. He bases this conclusion, with remarkable 
perception, on the lordS' , conduct at the dinner table, remembering 
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that on this occasion "no one ate even h alf his fill • .,76 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, Commynes ' 
pre-eminent concern was with the practical results of political 
conduct, largely divorced from outdated feudal codes. Commynes 
gives high praise to Mohammed II, the Turkish caliph from 1451 
to 1481, calling him "a wise and valiant prince, who made more 
use of sense and cunning than of valor and bOldness . ,,7'1 Such 
cunning, for Commynes, is a great political virtue: "Great c princes, 
or at least the wise ones, always look for a good pretense and 
. . . 78. .. one Wh1Ch 1S not too ObV10US . " Th1S tra1t 1S for Commynes 
the very basis of diplomacy. Describing a particular case 
of diplomatic maneuvering between Charles and Louis, he relates 
that "many envoys were sent from both sides to contrive all 
sorts of bargains by intrigue and to obtain the best terms 
79 from each other." It is not surprising, then, that Commynes ' 
favorite adjectives for describing treaties are "advantageous" 
and "disadvantageous." These two words, and not "honorable" 
and t'dishonorable;" describe diplomatic affairs . 
Only an analyst with an eye toward efficacy and advantage 
could write, as did Commynes, "I shall reveal an example of 
deceit, or a shrewd piece of business, or what ever you wish'2 
80 to call it, for it was wisely managed ." It is on this basis 
that Commynes admires King Louis XI . While Joinville had 
praised King Louis Louis IX for his preudomie, Commynes praises 
his master for playing upon men's avarice{as he had done 
with Commynes himself)to bri~them into his service: 
He was not discouraged if a man he was trying to win 
over at first refused to cooperate, but he continued 
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his persuasion by promising him many things and 
actually giving him monel and dignities which he 
knew the other coveted. 
Certainly no prud'homme would share Commynes ' opinion that 
. . . h h" 82 1t 1S a great v1rtue to know tI ow to flee at t e r1ght t1me ." 
There is no better illustration of Commyne's abandonment of 
his predecessors' feudal-chivalric precepts than his recurrent 
83 statement to the effect that "those who win get all the honor." 
To operate efficiently in Commynes' world it was necessary 
to possess experience. Commynes laments his own political 
naievet~ during his first years with Charles the Bold, at the 
/ 
Battle of Mont1hery : "I was amazed that anyone dared defend 
himself against the prince to whom I belonged; and I be-
1ieved him to be the greatest ruler of all. Such are those 
. . 84 C . d w1thout exper1ence." omrnynes also perce1 ve a great 
value in history as a means to educating oneself about the 
ways of the world: 
It seems to me ( and I speak on the basis of what I have 
seeniin this world, which includes eighteen years or more 
experience in close relationship with princes, having had 
intimate knowledge of the greatest and most secret affairs 
which have been transacted in the kingdom of France and 
in neighboring territories)that one of the surest 
ways to make a man wise is to have him read ancient 
history and learn how to conduct and guard himself 
and how to manage his affairs wisely, according 
to histories and examples of our ancestors. For 
our life is so short ~hat it cannot give8gs the necessary experience 1n so many matters. 
Here, in composite form, is an expression of Machiavelli ' s 
own source of authority, " long exper1ence in modern affairs 
86 and continuous reading in ancient ones," with which he 
justified his advice-giving in The Prince, in a work which 
antedates Machiavelli ' s by some twenty years . Commynes himself 
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cannot overemphasize the importance of the study of history: 
tt ••• one can learn more in three months ' time from read:iJ'!).g · 
a book than twenty men living successively could observe and 
d d 
. 87 un erstan from experlence." 
Commynes derived from contemporary affairs as well as 
from history many lessons to benefit the tfwiseprince," and 
through his own experience he felt qUalified to impart these 
lessons. He assumes tfthat stupid or simple people will not 
amuse themselves by reading these memoirs; but princes o~ 
court i ers will find some good advice in them. ,.88 Commynes ' 
reliance upon history's examples is not unflinching, though; 
he acknowledges that "enemies and princes are not always 
alike ." But, he continues, "their affairs are often of a 
similar nature, and therefore it is useful to be well-informed 
89 of things past ." He describes King Edward IV's forced 
flight from England in 1470 as a result of unreliable advice 
on the trustworthiness .of the Earl of Warwick, and goes 
on to write : 
This is a fine example for princes who never fear nor 
suspect their enemies and who would consider it beneath 
their dignity to do so. Most of their servants agree 
with them in order to flatter them. And they believe 
that they will be more respected and esteemed for it, 
and that people will say have spoken with courage. I 
do not know what people will say to their face, but 
wise persons will surely consider such words very 
foolish. It is all to one's credit to have well-
grounded fears and to protect oneself well against dan-
ger. It is invaluable for a prince to have a-i wa se:l.and 
trusted man in his entourage; he should be allowed to 
speak the truth and the prince should believe him. 90 
In this case, Commynes makes a single observation and draws 
from it numerous corollaries whose relevance is, admittealy, 
questionable . The Memoirs are indeed full of such sententiae 
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on political conduct . Some are straightforward and so uncontro-
versial as to be banal: "If people were always . wise they would be so 
moderate in their words in times of prosperity that they would 
h h ·· d' 91 not ave cause to c ange ln tlme of a Nerslty.tf Most, though , 
like Commynes ' precepts for the conduct of diplomacy, reflect 
his awareness of the questionable morality of his age: 
•. • for one messenger or ambassador whom they would send 
me me, . I should send them two in return ••• For there is no 
·'·--J:5etter nor safer way to send aspy, nor could he be in 
any better position to see and hear everything. And 
if you send two or three men together, it is hardly 
possible that the enemy could be so cautious as to pre-
vent one or t he other from obtaining some useful infor-
mation, secretly or otherwise .•• One should expect a wise 
prince to see to that one or more friends are constantly 
about the enemy ••• 
It may be objected that as a result of this treatment 
y.bur. enemy will become all the more proud. It does not 
matter to me if he does. In this manner I shall know 
more about his designs. For when all is said and done , 
he who collects the §20fits from such affairs will 
also have the honor. 
In the end, Commynes ' Memoirs are a work of extraordinary 
nistgrical a a rid political insight, as far removed from his pre-
gecessors':· emp:\:!y praise of institutions grown hollow as 
was Louis Xl's saigesse from Louis i IX'. s preudomie. With 
Commynes, French historiography can be said to have " caught 
up" with, or even anticipated the future of, its Italian 
counterpart. It is fitting, then, that it is an historian 
largely of Italian affairs who in discussing Commynes' interest ; 
in "the practical wisdom of the prince" writes that "the 
93 
modernity of this emphasis scarcely needs comment" 
CHAPTER VI 
GUICCIARDINI AND COMMYNES ON THE 1494 INVASION: 
crn~ARISON A~m CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis of Commynes ' Memoirs in the light 
of their composition in two distinc~ sections has explained that 
Commynes' inability to find a fully workable substructural 
explanation for the course of the Rl1?ench expedition to Naples 
in divine or meta-historical terms led him to rely heavily 
on human action to explain these events. Like Guicciardini, 
who in his History of Italy discerns no order at all in these 
events, Commynes frees his narrative from all-encompassing 
transcendental underpinnings. The two works are also similar 
in they are both attempts to explain failures: Commynes relates 
the failure of the French in Naples in 1494-95, and Guicciardini 
the failure of Italy in the face of foreign invasion. Thus 
the two authors no longer reflect the national or civic bias 
of their earlier works. While Guicciardini harbors his 
contemporaries' view of Italian superiority, this is not the 
axiomatic principle that it was for his humanist predecessors. 
Thus he can describe the French army which descends on Italy 
in glowing terms. He writes that while King Ferrante of 
Naples proclaimed publicly his great power, he "realized full 
well " that the French were "greatly superior in cavalry, infantry; 
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sea power, artillery, money and men most ardent to confront 
every peril for ••• their king. ,,1 Likewise, Commynes describes 
Charles VIII' s actions in terms of his i ncompetence in handling 
affairs , for example in his remarks on the king's seemingly 
infinite capacity to procrastinate, which made perilous the 
French retreat from Nap1es . 2 In their accounts of the 
Neapolitan expedition, the bvo histori ans' attempts at dis-
passionate and particularistic explanations lead them to make 
many similar observations and draw many similar conclusions from 
the events they narrate . 
Both Guicciardini and Commynes see through French attempts 
to justify the expedition as the first step towards a crusade . 
Guicciardini writes that Charles ' advisers 
filled his head with vain thoughts to the effect that 
this would provide him with an opportunity to surpass 
the glory of his predecessors, for once having acquired 
the kingdom of Naples, it would be e asy for him to 
conqqa a:?' r the Turkish empire. 3 
Commynes is much more direct in expressing hi s opinion of the 
chimerical nature of Charles ' expression of a desire to u se 
the conquest of Naples as a stepping-stone to a crusade : 
According to Commynes, "this was a very bad thing (to say) , 
b . t 1 . ,, 4 ecause 1 was ale •• • Commynes and Guicciardini also 
provide similar descriptions of Charles ' decision to assert 
his Neapolitan claim and his preparations for the expedition. 
Writes Commynes: "The enterprise seemed most unreasonable to 
h · . d 5 those w 0 were Wlse and experlence .ff In fact, says 
Commynes, only three people approved of the expedition . 
The first was the king himself. The second was Etienne of 
Vesc, tt a man of petty lineage who had never heard or seen 
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anything. ,, 6 The third was a receiver of taxes named 
Briconnet, who advocated the expedition because he stood 
to gain a cardinalate and many benefices. 7 Charles was also, 
according to Commynes, ill-prepared for the expedition: "All 
the things necessary for such a great enterprise were lacking. 
For the king was very young ••• (and)feeble in person. He had 
few wise persons about him. He had no ready cash ••• (The army) 
h d 'th t t '1' "8 a nel er en s nor pavl lons .•• On a later occasion 
Commynes adds that this was Charles ' first venture outside 
of his own kingdom. 9 After reading Commynes' catalogue of why 
the expedition should fail, it is surprising that the French 
army makes any headway at all in Italy. Commynes is forc'ed to 
'~nc1ude that this tripo •• was led by God because the judgment of 
" 10 the 1eaders ••. was hardly of any use to the expedltlon." 
Here Commynes is invoking God in a manner different from that 
of Villehardouin, who described events he himself considered 
to be part of a divine purpose. Commynes is also invoking God 
in a manner unlike that in the earlier part of the Memoirs. 
God here guides events that transpire contrary to what should 
be expected. Though, as we have seen, he uses Savonoro1a's 
prophecies to explain some of the French army's successes , 
these instances are not numerous, and this theme is not sus-
tained throughout his account of Charles' Italian adventure. 
To a larger extent, Commynes discerns here inscrutability in 
history, more in line with his later comment on unforeseen 
events while Charles VIII wis at Rome: "God showed how all 
, , 11 , 
these thlngs were beyond man's understandlng." ThlS ap-
praisa1 of God ' s role in history has more in common with 
Guicciardini' s concept of fortune than it has with any 
.1ll 
notion of a discernible pattern of divine causation . 
Guicciardin2s account of the circumstances of the French 
decision to undertake the war, and their preparation for it, 
is strikingly similar to that of Cornmynes. He says that while 
some of the king's advisers favored the expedition, people 
of greater wisdom judged 
judgedt that such a war would inevitably prove very 
difficult and aangerous inasmuch as the armies had to 
be brought to a foreign country, very far from the kingdom 
of France • •• 
Added to this was the lack of money, of which it was 
considered a great deal would be necessary.12 
Guicciardini goes on to say of those who advised the were 
tha 
that they were "stirred by hopes either of acquiring property 
in the kingdom of Naples or obtaining certain ecclesiastical 
preferments and reveiines . ,,13 Finally, he concludes that "King 
Charles was eager to make war in Italy, preferring the rash 
counsels of inexperienced and vulgar men over the example 
of his father, a prudent king of long-proven experience.,,14 
Guicciardini, like Commynes, thinks ill of Charles, and 
prefers the wisdom of Louis XI, who at the outset of his 
reign had shocked his Angevin and Orleanist subjects by 
, I' 15 declarlng t at Italy was best left to the tallans. 
ThE:The similarity of the the two authors may be explained partly 
by Guicciardini's consult ation of Commynes' Memoirs in his 
, , 16 h 
pr~paratlon of the Hlstory of Italy, though t ere are doubts 
about the accuracy a :nd · completeness of the editions of the 
M ' h' h ' , , d' , 17 , emOlrs W lC were avallable to GUlcclar lnl . But thlS 
fact cannot account fully for Guicciardini's sympathy for 
Commynes ' outlook as, for exampie, Guicciardini ' s praise 
1 12 
for Louis XI seems all his own, in line with his own view of 
gratuitous war-making. He was also aware, before his reading 
of Commynes' Memoirs. of Charles VIII ' s character, having 
written some thirty years earlier in his History of Florence 
that Charles was "a bold young king" who "was by nature inclined 
to this sort of enterprise.,,18 Moreover, Guicciardini was not 
constrained to use Commynes as his source . Had he been so 
inclined, he could have used instead the account of Andre de la 
Vigne , a court historian of Charles VIII, who kept a daily 
chronicle of the French expedition to Italy. In this work, 
"Charles VIII and his nobles are types of Christian knights 
engaged in the first preliminaries of a gigantic struggle to 
h . d 19 free t e holy land from the lnva ers." The fact that Guic~i:ardini 
chose to use Commynes' account must be seen as a result of the 
two men's common outlook on what is important in pOlitical 
affairs a nd historical investigation, for, as we will see , 
their concerns concur in almost all particulars. 
Even their political conceptions have a great deal in 
common. Guicciardini ' s Discourses of Logrogno, written while 
Florence was ruled by a broadly based republic, advocates 
reform in favor of aristocratic control of the processes of 
gove.rnment. His model state is b ased upon his interpretation of 
h .. V' 20 t e constltUbDn of enlce. Commynes shares Guicciardini ' s 
view of the merits of locating power in the hands of the 
aristocracy and his admiration for Venice ' s government. The 
Venetians, writes Commynes, 
do not have civil strife in the city, and this is the greatest 
wealth that I can see that they have. And they have 
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marvelously well provided for that in many respects , 
for ••• the people have no influence and are not 
consulted in any matter and all the office-holders 21 
are gentlemen with the exception of their secretaries . 
Their similarity of outlook on what constitutes a wise prince 
is evident in Guicciardini's condemnation of Piero de' Medici 
in the History of Florence: ttIf he did decide to trust someone 
or take advice, he never sought out men who had any great 
22 experience in government ." This recalls strikingly Commynes ' 
emphasis on a prince's need for sound advice discussed in the 
previous chapter . Guicciardini, like Commynes, spent part 
of his career as an ambassador. His insights into the conduct 
of diplomacy, cUlled from his experience at the court of 
King Ferdinand of Aragon, are similar to those which Commynes 
distilled into his advice to princes on the nature of an 
ambassador's duties. Guicciardini, in his Ricordi, observes 
that "the tyrant does everything possible to uncover the secret 
of your mind, by flattery, by long conversation, and having 
you observed by others who by his orders make friends with you . ,,23 
It is in the two men's historical descriptions and historical 
judgments, however, that the affinity of their ideas is most 
apparent. For a Frenchman, Commynes ' description of Medici 
political power is most penetrating ; Lorenzo was possessed 
of great power, but 
he wielded this power with great moderation, for ••. 
he was one of the wisest men of his age ~ But the 
son thought this (pawer)was his by right, and he 
made himself feared by means of (his)guard; he 
perpetrated violence at night and fights, and he 
helped himself abundantly to their public monies . So 
had the fatherA but so shrewdly that they were almost 
happy about it~4 
Guicciardini, who gives Lorenzo high praise as the guardian of 
25 Italy ' s pre-1494 peace , writes that Piero, on the other hand, 
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was not ., capable of governing with that moderation with which 
his father had proceeded in both domestic and foreign affairs ... 26 
Likewise, just as Commynes describes Florence ' s motivation for 
overthrowing Piero in 1494 in terms of the Medici ' s undermining 
of FlorentiYEliberty,27not especially emphasizing the French 
expulsion of Florentine merchants as might be expected, Guicciardini 
relates that many Florentines "highly disapproved of the 
present government, and the fact that a single family should 
h d h ·· . . 28 ave arrogate the power of t e entlre republlc l tO ltself . 
Most events are explained by the two historians in 
similar terms. Describing Piero de ' Medici ' s trip to negotiate 
with Charles VIIIin 1494, Guicciardini relates that Piero 
capitulated to all of CRar~es' ~umerous and excessive demands .•• 
All the French were greatly amazed that Piero had so lightly 
complied with such important demands; for the king undoubtedly 
would have been satisfied with easier terms'i ,,29 Guicciardini 
has clearly drawn upon Commynes' account of the negotiations, but 
spares the reader from some of the more undignified details of 
the events . Commynes relates that Piero 
agreed to everything without Gonsulting his companions ••• 
this amounted to putting their state and their power into 
our own hands. Those who dealt with Piero told me about 
it, making fun of him and expressing shock at how he 
granted such great things, things which they never had 
expected . 3D 
An historian in the French chivalric mode might have attributed 
Piero ' s capitulation to his fear of the superiority of French 
arms, and included a de scription of the colorful banners and 
gleaming swords of the French camp. On the Italian side" a 
sycophantic humanist would have attempted to apologize for 
Piero's capitulation. Guicciardini, though, attributes 
Fiero's conduct to his poor judgment, and Commynes, making 
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no referenceto divine intercession on behalf of Charles ' 
Neapolitan destiny, explains it only in terms of Piero's personal 
failure. Both authors l ook directly at the actions of the 
actors on the historical stage to explain the course of events . 
As we have seen previously, Guicciardini surpassed 
his predecessors in his interest in motivations for rulers ' 
actions. Commynes, too, was concerned with motivations, and 
like Guicciardini attributes many actions to cupidity and 
ambition. Commynes says that as soon as Charles VIII had 
control of Pisa, Ludovico Sforza I1wou1d have liked to have 
th k ' t f It 1 1 d 11~1 e lng ou 0 a y a rea y. ,11. Though in this instance 
Commynes ' explanation does not approach the thoroughness of 
Guicciardini's, he shares Guicciardini's emphasis on Ludovico' s 
desire to put an end to the French expedition as soon as 
32 the king reached Tuscany. An examination of Commynes' 
and Guicciardini ' s analyses of the purposes of the Venetian 
government, in both the ir initial neutrality in the 1494 war 
and their subsequent jo±hingi of the League of Venice against 
the French. According to Guicciardini, when before the French 
expedition the prospect of war hung over Italy, 
Only the Venetians determined to remain neutral and 
await the outcome of this affair, either because it 
was not to their advantage that Italy should be in 
turmoil, in hopes that protracted wars of others would 
" .give them an opportunity to expand their empire; or 
because, being so powerful, they were therefore not afraid 
of easily falling prey to the conqueror; and that it was 
therefore unwise, with no evident necessity, to become 
involved in other people's wars. 33 
Commynes' explanation of Venetian motives focuses on the 
former, avaricious concern, rather than on the latter, 
prudential one . He asserts that " it seemed to the Venetians 
116 
that it would be to their profit if wars would break out 
between the king ( Charles VIII) and the house of Aragon'~ 34 
The two writers place the Venetian decision to adhere to the 
leagu~ which bore their city's name at exact same moment . 
Writes Commynes : 
When Venice became aware that the king had the Florentine ' s 
places in his hands, and especiallY Pisa, they began to 
be afraid, and they discuss~d(with Ludovico Sforza's 
ambassad~5s)means of preventing him from proceeding 
further. 
Guicciardini concurs : 
•• • after seeing the vehement course of French good 
fortune, and how the king and his army were passing 
through Italy like a thunderbolt without any resistance, 
the Venetians began to consider the misfortunes of others 
as dangers to themselves, and to fear that the ruin 
of others would inevitabl¥ invo:l1ve tileir own; especiallY 
the fact that Charles had occupied Pisa and the other 
Florentine fortresses. 36 
The context of these analyses in the two works reflects 
the experiences and the national concerns of the two historians . 
Guicciardini includes in the History of Italy an ' extended 
37 discussion of Florence ' s reasons for not joining the League . 
Commynes' description of the actions of the Venetians occurs 
within a discussion of his own embassy at Venice, where he 
represented Charles during most of the French stay 
in Italy and negotiated extensively with the ambassadors of the 
other Italian powers.38 . These differences of national emphasis 
are frequently discernible in the two works . Commynes delves 
more deeply into the politics of the French bureauuer?,cy in 
Naples, while Guicciardini discusses extensively Florence's 
political scene in the aftermath of the expulsion of Piero de ' 
Medici . A page-by-page reading of the two accounts of the 
events of 1494-95, though, yield no essential discrepancies 
of fact , and, as mentioned earlier, many similar judgments . 
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In the previous chapter it was noted that the French 
loss of Naples is framed by Commynes largely in terms of human 
causal agents . Commynes writes that Charles was "badly served ••• 
by his governors, who have managed their own affairs very 
well . but his affairs badly,,,39 and condemns Charles ' policies 
because "he did not make any effort to take care of the matter 
40 personally." As an Italian, with less concern for the 
nitty-gritty of French affairs, Guicciardini gives a more 
compact rendition of the same ideas . Charles, he writes , "left 
the governing of weighty affairs to his courtiers, who, partly 
as a result of incapacity and partly because of avarice , made a 
. . 41 . . great confus10n of all th1ngs . " It 1S also worth not1ng that 
Guicciardini does not serve national pride by celebrating the 
efforts of the people of Naples to expel the foreigner. The 
French lost Naples more than the self-serving Neapolitan 
barons regained it from them, and Guicciardini acknowledges this 
fact. 
The most important mil itary engagement of Charles VIII ' s 
Italian wars was the Battle of Fornovo of July l495~, . in which 
the retreating French army faced the combined forces of the 
League of Venice. Thus, the treatment given the battle by the 
two authors is most relevant to any comparison of their 
views. Commynes, in all likelihood as a result of his familiarity 
42 
with the work of the historians of ancient Rome, recognizes 
nature ' s prophecies concerning the outcome of battles. The night 
before the battle, he writes, tfthere was a great rain, light-
ning, and thunder, so strong that one could not imagine more; it 
seemed heaven and earth were splitting , or that it signified a 
11 8 
43 great misfortune to come ." However, it is Guicciardini, more 
familiar with Roman historians and himself writing a 1ttrue 
history, If in the humanist sense, who makes more of these 
m~rological occurrences, describing their real and imagined 
significance: 
This storm troubled the French rooreU :han the Italian 
army, not only because they were in t h e midst of 
mountains and enemies in a place where, if misfortune 
struck them, they had no hope whatever of saving them-
selves ••• but also because it seemed more likely that 
threateniilgss from heaven, which usually manifest 
themselves only for. the most important reasons, were 
primarily directed against than side ~here the person 
of so strong a King was to be found. 4 
Similarly, CCommynes' Memoirs are not structured independently of 
the tradition out of which his historiography emerged. Thus 
it is not unexpected that he should provide a striking visual 
description of the army fielded by the Marquis of Mantua: "They 
were all · men-at-arms in armor with fine plumes and beautiful 
45 bordonasses(a type of lance)." Indeed, such an observation 
would have been routin~l¥cd.ncluded in the work of a Froissart 
or a la Marche. Commynes, however, departs markedly from the 
French tradition in describing graphically how the pages of 
the French army weret a 13le(j' gwith the hatchets used in the 
construction of the French encampment, to crack wide open 
d 
. . 46 both the helmets and the skulls of armore Itallan soldlers . 
Aspects of their accounts of the conduct of the Battle of 
Fornovo also reveal the historians' similar concerns. Both 
report the suppression of theFrench army's temptation to 
pillage the Italian camp by cries of "Remember Guinnegate, U 
a reference to a 1479 battle which Louis XI's nearly victorious 
army lost its advantage over its German adversary because 
it was lured away from the battle by the prospect of acquiring 
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47 booty . Commynes here also reflects his perception of 
history ' s ability to teach by example. While Guicciardini may 
have included this detail only because he read it in Commynes ' 
Memoirs, this is clearly an instance where his usual skepticism 
about the wisdom of taking exampi!ies from history is mitigated 
by simi1arites of circumstance. 48 Both Commynes and Guicciardini 
mention the speed with the battle progressed, pointing out 
that this was uncharacteristic of Italian warfare. Both 
historians perceived this distinguishing feature of the Battle of 
Fornovt), noting that traditiona11yl y :):ta1 ian battles pitted 
. . .. 49 . 
slng1e squadrons agalnst each other ln succeSSlon . Flna11y, 
Commynes and Guicciardini concur in their opinion on the outcome 
of the battle, even though "each side sought to claim victory 
for itse1f.,,50 Commynes writes that while the Italians who 
fought alongside the French wanted to remain at Fornovo "ito 
combat those a mong the enemy "[ho remained,ttthe Frenchmen 
who were asked about it(Commynes himself was undoubtedly among 
51 them)did not agree and said that we had accomplished enough" 
Guicciardini, writing long after the battle took place, says 
that 
the palm of victory was universally accorded to the 
French: because of the great difference in the number 
of the dead, and because they had routed the enemy to 
the other side, and because they had won free passage 
to advance, which was the very issue for which the 
battle had been fought. ' 52 
Both Commynes and Guicciardini perceive the momentousness of 
this battle and their analyses penetrate to its very essence . 
Francesco Guicciardini, in the History of Italy, and 
Philippe de Commynes, in his Memoirs, represent the development 
of their respective traditions into the quest for 
1 20 
historical investigation. Guicciardini ' s tradition focused on 
the republican ideal of Florentine humanism This strain was 
most present in the work of the fifteenth-century humanist 
historiographers, who exalted Florence' s institutions as 
comparable to those of r epublican Roma This tradition 
persisted into the earlYf:cirrIuecento historians and Guicciardini r s 
own early work . After Italy's institutions had failed her, 
Guicciardini realized that an understanding of Italy' s subject ion 
to foreign rule could not be reached within this limited 
setting, and extended his scope to all of Italy and, where 
relevant, the affairs of Europe . Florence could no longer 
legimately be seen as the focus of European pOlitics. 
Commynes, too, transcended the bounds of his inherited 
tradition. His predecessors' formulaic use of chivalry to 
give meaning to history no longer had any relevance in French 
politics. He instead sought to understand events on their own 
terms, with a meaning beyond the heroic feats of historical 
protagonists. Commynes was able to posit an overarching 
framework for the reign of Louis XI, the subject b f the first 
section of his Memoirs, but his failure to find a viable 
framework for the second part of his work led him to examine 
human causation. 
While both Commynes and Guicciardini inherited stylistic 
and i fermal traits from their traditions, these were never so 
pronounced as to interfere with their searches for explanation . 
They wrote in a heavy plodding style which allowed them to 
analyze their subject matter as carefully as language would allow . 
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Both men were participants in the events they describe, 
and both narrate what were essentially failures. Commynes, 
unable to find a framework for his narration, blames the French 
fail ure in Naples on men who ' :exercised judgments contrary to 
his own. Guicciardini himself was intimately involved with 
Italy's vain efforts to stem the tide of foreign domination. 
He blames Italy's fate on the ambition and folly of princes , 
but also on the totally unfathomable mysteries of fortune . 
He sought explanations, but could find none. 
The litmus test of an historian's conceptual ability is 
the capacity to perceive the effects of the events described . 
In the cases we have been discussing, both historians pass this 
test. Commynes wrote the second part of his Memoirs, in 1496 , 
in the immediate aftermath of his subject-matter, and could 
little benefit from historical distance . Yet he perceived 
the total failure of Charles VIII's Italian escapade. His 
focus is alsona~rdW?d by the limited importance of these events 
to the affairs of France, but he recognizes that ttall these 
wars ofI Italy had miscarried, ••• afterwards all was 10st.tt52 
Still, from the French point of view the story would begin 
completely anew upon Lou i s :"£XI I , s 1498 invasion. For Guicciardini , 
a chain of events had been set in motion that would shatter 
the very structure of I taly. Writing forty years later, he 
saw the invasion not as a single episode, but as "the b e =: 
ginning of those years of misfortune, because it opened the 
door to innumerable calamities, in which ••• a great part of 
. ,,53 h' . the world was subsequently lnvolved. Bot hlstorlans, to the 
extent that they could, investigated the effects of historical 
events . tn seeking the causes of events, both good and bad, 
1 22 
in human conduct, they investigated not only past events but 
sought to investigate the human condition. 
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